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Si Von me demande quelle est lapremiere rgle de lapolitique? C'est
d'trejuste. Quelle est la seconde? C'est d' trejuste. Et la troisime?
C'est encore d' trejuste.
Condorcet, Journal de Paris, 22 juin 17771
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal, political and legal decisions often require group choices. For
example, in the personal setting, a group of individuals may choose between
mushrooms, anchovies or green peppers as the favored topping for their
pizza. In the political setting, voters choose individual legislators to represent
them in choosing the statutory laws that govern society. Juries and judges
choose the proper outcomes in particular legal cases. In each case, a
procedure is required to convert individual decisions or choices into a
collective group decision. In the pizza example, each person states his or her
individual preference for toppings, and the group reaches a decision by
counting votes for one alternative or the other. Similarly, voters in political
contests enter the voting booth with their individual preferences for
candidates, and a winner is declared by tallying votes. The votes of
individual legislators are tallied to determine the "winner" or policy decision
of the legislative body. Panels ofjudges and juries also tally votes to arrive at
legal decisions.
Perhaps no great injustice is done if the "wrong" gustatory choice is made
for the pizza. On the other hand, electoral, legislative, judicial and jury panel
decisions should satisfy some basic notions of fairness and justice. Despite
similarities among the different collective choice mechanisms, the model for
each category of group decision making may differ. For example, the
1. Letter from Condorcet to Editors, Journal du Paris, reprinted in 1 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET
347-48 (A. Condorcet & M.F. Arago eds., 1847) ("If I'm asked what is the first rule of politics?
Justice. The second? Justice. And the third? Again, justice.") Unless otherwise indicated by citation to
an English edition, translations throughout this Article are provided by the author.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/3
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procedure involved in making personal choices might be described as one of
purely preference aggregation. In contrast, decisions of juries and panels of
judges involve judgment aggregation.2 While preference aggregations need
only represent the "authentic" group choice, judgment aggregations should
be both authentic 3 and "accurate." 4 In other words, they should correctly
reflect objective truths. Despite some differences among the various
aggregation models, general theories about group decision making can bring
something to bear on all types of collective choices.
Social choice theory explores the ways in which individual preferences or
choices translate into group choices.5 One of the most devastating discoveries
of social choice theory is sometimes known as the "voting paradox," brought
back to modem consciousness by economist, Kenneth Arrow, in his famous
2. An intermediate type of choice aggregation is representative aggregation, in which
legislators representing various constituencies adopt a collective legislative policy. Depending upon
one's view of the legislator's role, this type of collective choice may resemble judgment or preference
aggregation. For example, if one views legislators as exercising their own best judgments or personal
choices regarding the best policy, the choice may resemble judgment aggregation (if one believes that
there is a correct choice) or preference aggregation (if one believes that legislators simply vote their
personal preferences.) On the other hand, if one views the legislator's role as reflecting the views of
the constituents, then the representative aggregation should "fit" the desires of the constituents. See,
e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 89-90
(1986). Voter choices for representatives might also be viewed as either preference aggregation, if
voters simply choose the preferred candidate, or judgment aggregation if they choose the best
candidate for the position.
3. In some cases, however, even an authentic group choice may be wrong. For example,
imagine that one judge on a judicial panel or one juror on a jury panel sees the "truth" and all the
others are wrong. The wrong choice here may, in fact, be the authentic choice. By this standard, even a
unanimous decision can be wrong. As a general rule, however, no one judge or juror has a monopoly
on truth, assuming that they have the same access to the same information. Given a reasonable parity
of judgment ability or competence among members of the decision-making group, an authentic group
decision has a greater probability of being accurate. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
4. The distinctions between preference aggregation and judgment aggregation and the different
standards of authenticity and accuracy that apply to each, respectively, were thoughtfully made in
Komhauser & Sager, supra note 2, at 91-92.
5. The term "social choice theory" often is used synonymously with "public choice theory."
Another term frequently used to describe the literature is "rational choice theory." These terms loosely
refer to the use of economic models for studying politics and decision making more generally. Another
general term often used to describe these approaches is "positive political theory." See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565 (1995). This Article uses
rational choice or public choice to refer to the broader "economic study of nonmarket decision making,
or simply the application of economics to political science." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II I
(1989).
Social choice theory refers to the more narrow exploration of the "properties of social welfare or
social choice functions," i.e., the aggregation of individual choices into a group decision. MUELLER,
supra, at 3. So understood, social choice theory can be viewed as a smaller subset of the larger rational
or public choice theory. There is no uniform agreement regarding all features of these economically
based political theories. For a useful description of the competing views on rational choice theory, see
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 13-19 (1994).
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work entitled Social Choice and Individual Values.6 Roughly stated, the
paradox is that voting in situations involving more than a simple, binary
choice will not always reveal the true decision of a decision-making body.
For decisions involving more than two alternative choices, the voting
paradox shows that common procedures, including simple majority vote, will
not necessarily yield a group decision that legitimately represents the voice of
the majority. Moreover, the paradox proves that merely changing the order in
which choices are presented for a vote can alter outcomes even though the
distribution of voter choices remains constant.7 In other words, most
democratic voting procedures provide results that are inconsistent, arbitrary
or unstable.
One way out of the voting paradox dilemma is to require a unanimous
decision. A decision supported by all of the decision makers can claim
legitimacy as the collective voice of the group.8 When the decision-making
group is relatively small, it could efficiently make decisions under a
unanimity or "rule by consensus" procedure. Thus, at a minimum,
unanimous jury verdict requirements provide both practical feasibility and
also avoid the voting paradox issues presented by other voting procedures. 9
Similarly, panels of judges conceivably could operate under a rule by
consensus. However, even these small decision-making bodies often do not
operate under a unanimity decision rule. In most civil cases and in some
criminal cases, unanimous jury verdicts are not required.' 0 Additionally,
although some judicial panels may prefer to reach unanimous decisions in
some cases," they are generally not required to do so. To make most
6. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
7. For a more detailed discussion of the paradox, see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
8. Whether the unanimous decision of the group is also 'just" or "correct" in an objective sense
is a different, and much more difficult question. For a discussion of probability theory as applied to the
correctness ofjudgments, see infra notes 13846 and accompanying text.
9. On the other hand, a unanimity requirement imposes other costs. For example, jury studies
suggest that jurors perceive more pressure to change their positions and find it much more difficult to
reach a decision in unanimous verdict situations. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 79
(1983). In addition, juries generally take longer to reach a decision under a unanimity rule, and they
are more likely to reach no decision; that is, a hung jury. See id. at 29.
10. See id. at 2 (briefly surveying jury trial rules in different jurisdictions).
11. This preference is especially prevalent in exceptional cases of great public importance and
interest. Perhaps the most famous instance is the extraordinary effort to announce a unanimous
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, involving the desegregation of public schools. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 737-883 (1975). A similarly extraordinary effort went into developing a
unanimous decision for the Supreme Court regarding President Nixon's executive privilege claims in
connection with subpoenaed Watergate tapes. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 339-412 (1979). Even in these cases, the unanimous
opinions did not necessarily reflect true consensus since some of the judges may have conceded
ground simply to arrive at a unanimous opinion.
[VOL. 76:975
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electoral and legislative decisions by consensus would be difficult,
impractical and, more likely, impossible. In the end, through choice or
necessity, most legal and political decision-making bodies use decision rules
other than unanimity for making collective choices. Majority or
supermajority voting procedures are by far the most common of these rules.
Another way out of the voting paradox dilemma is to reduce the
necessary decision to a simple, binary choice. For example, the law could
limit judicial panels or juries to simply find for the plaintiff or for the
defendant. Unfortunately, however, complex cases often must involve
multiple choices. For example, consider a jury trial with three possible
outcomes: acquittal, murder or manslaughter. Consider also that voters often
choose among more than two candidates and that legislators surely often
choose from multiple policy options. In sum, to limit most group decisions to
two simple options also will prove difficult, impractical or impossible.
Needless to say, if the voting mechanisms used by juridical and political
decision-making bodies frequently result in decisions that are inconsistent
arbitrary or unstable, there is indeed a fundamental problem at the heart of
democratic voting practices. Numerous academics offer significant
observations with regard to this problem. Frank Easterbrook argues that the
voting paradox explains inconsistencies in Supreme Court opinions. He
concluded, "Inconsistency is inevitable, ... no matter how much the Justices
may disregard their own preferences, no matter how carefully they may
approach their tasks, no matter how skilled they may be." 12 Similarly,
political scientist William Riker posed the question: "The possibility that
social choice by voting produces inconsistent results raises deep questions
about democracy. Can the democratic ideal be attained if the method used to
attain it produces confusion?"'13 Based on the voting paradox, Robert Wolff,
a philosopher at Columbia University, concludes that "majority rule is fatally
flawed by an internal inconsistency which ought to disqualify it from
consideration in any political community whatsoever." 14 Economist Allan
Feldman observes, "This clearly negative result casts doubts on all assertions
that there is a 'general will,' a 'social contract,' a 'social good,' a 'will of the
people,' a 'people's government,' a 'people's voice,' a 'social benefit,' and
so on and so forth."'15 These observations will not come as a shock to anyone
familiar with the literature. The existing legal literature now incorporates
12. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 813 (1992).
13. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 18 (1982).
14. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 59 (1970).
15. ALLANM. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICETHEORY 191 (1980).
1998]
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extensive analysis of the voting paradox, its implications in a wide range of
juridical contexts, and it suggests some answers to the serious questions
raised.1 6 Moreover, concern with the voting paradox is not limited to
academicians. Citations to Arrow's work on social choice have begun to
appear in court opinions.'
7
Similar concerns appear in the popular press where, for example,
Washington Post reporter Malcolm Gladwell asked, "Could it be that the
choice of our leaders and the shape of our political history is sometimes
simply an accident? ... And if we have no idea whether an electoral result
actually represents the will of the people, how can any democratic
government be considered legitimate?"' 8 Newspaper coverage of three-way
presidential elections is perhaps the best indication that the voting paradox
has entered the mainstream. Reporting on the possibility of a three-way race
between Bill Clinton, Ross Perot and Colin Powell in the 1996 presidential
election, the Washington Post cited to the paradox, noting that "[e]conomist
Kenneth J. Arrow won a Nobel prize in part for his 1951 proof that there is
no 'perfect' democratic voting system for multicandidate elections."' 9 In a
similar story on a possible three-way 1992 presidential contest between
George Bush, Lloyd Bentsen and Jesse Jackson, the Washington Post
reported that "[i]n any contest where there are more than two alternatives-
from choosing a president to picking Miss America-even the most
democratic and common-sense voting methods can sometimes produce
bizarre results that seem to have little to do with what people actually
16. See, e.g.. Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHI-KENT L. REv. 707 (1991); Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 823-3 1; Saul Levmore,
Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One? 12 INTERNAT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 145,
156-57 (1992) [hereinafter Levmore, Bicameralism]; Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority
Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 1001 (1989); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back From the
Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1329-50 (1995); articles cited infra
notes 23-24.
17. See, e.g., DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 409 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing
Arrow to explain that reasoning in plurality Supreme Court decisions may have "no single line of
reasoning ... that is both internally consistent and is subscribed to by a majority with respect to each
premise and conclusion"); Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 905 F.2d 406,
411 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing difficulties inherent to majority voting leading to increased power of the
agenda setter); Winkler v. State of West Virginia Building Authority, 434 S.E.2d 420, 439 n.2 (W. Va.
1993) (Neely, J., concurring) (citing Arrow for proposition that "the means invariably overwhelm the
ends in the world of practical politics").
18. Malcolm Gladwell, When Votes Are In, Have the People Spoken? WASH. POST, June 4,
1990, at A3.
19. Kathy Sawyer, A Paradox ofMajority Politics, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at A3.
[VOL. 76:975
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2 0
Except by way of background and introduction, the goal of this Article is
not to revisit the ground already skillfully covered in the existing legal
literature on social choice theory in general and on the voting paradox in
particular. Instead, this Article seeks to set the record straight. Although
Kenneth Arrow popularized the concept, most authors, including Arrow
himself, attribute discovery of the paradox to the Marquis de Condorcet, an
eighteenth century French Enlightenment mathematician and political
theorist.2' Some refer to Condorcet as the father of social choice theory.22 In
fact, while most scholars label the voting paradox with "Arrow's paradox,"
or "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," a minority of scholars use the alternate
term "Condorcet's paradox." 23 Many citations to Arrow in the legal literature
include little more than a passing, almost ritual, acknowledgment that the
Marquis de Condorcet first discovered the voting paradox in the eighteenth
century.
24
20. Gladwell, supra note 18; cf Malcolm W. Browne, Can Voting Become Safer for Democracy?
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1980, at E7 (citing to Arrow and the voting paradox in reporting on the New
Hampshire presidential primary).
21. See ARROW, supra note 6, at 93-94; see also MUELLER, supra note 5, at 3. In fact, Arrow and
others note that Condoreet was inspired by an even earlier work of Jean-Charles de Borda, M~moires
sur les Rlections au scrutin, MtMOIRES DE L'ACADtMIE ROYALE DES SCIENCES (1781). See ARROW,
supra note 6, at 93-94 n.12; MUELLER, supra note 5, at 3. Condorcet discussed the voting paradox in a
1785 essay in which he attempted to apply mathematical principles to social decision making. See
Condorcet, Essai sur I'application de l'analyse i la probabili des d~cisions rendues 6 la plurali
des voix [Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision Making], translated in
CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33 (K. Baker ed. 1976) [hereinafter Condorcet, Essay].
Translations of several portions of the 1785 Essay also appear in IAIN MCLEAN & FIONA HEWITr,
CONDORCET: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY 120-138 (1994).
22. See lain McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet's
Theor
, 
of Social Choice? 73 PUB. CHOICE 445, 446 (1992); Arnold B. Urken, The Condorcet-
Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social Choice Theory, 72 PUB. CHOICE 213, 215 (1991); see
also Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1221
(1994).
23. For literature using the term Condorcet's paradox, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 289-93 (1980); William V. Gehrlein, Condorcet's Paradox, 15 THEORY &
DECISION 161 (1983); Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 471,486 n.57
(1993); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article 4 and
the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 950; Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 12 n.12 (1993); Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Appreciation of the Bill of Rights:
The Limits and Potential of Law and Economics in Discussing Constitutional Issues, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 189, 205 n.18.
24. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 23, at 486 n.57 ("The literature begins with Condorcet's
paradox, which was generalized by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem."); Bernard Grofman, Public
Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice"
Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1541, 1551-52 (1993) ("The paradox of cyclical majorities, known since at
least the time of Condorcet (1787), is a specter that has haunted Social Choice theory since Black and
Arrow rediscovered it."); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Readers reaching this point understandably should be asking--so what?
No one has argued that the voting paradox has been inaccurately described or
misconstrued. Regardless of the label used to describe the phenomenon, the
political and juridical issues raised by the voting paradox remain the same. If
Condorcet first discovered the voting paradox, surely more scholars should
give credit where credit is due. Of course, the point to be made is much
larger and stems from a more extensive look at Condorcet's overall work.
The legal academy sometimes distorts the record when engaged in
interdisciplinary research. Most references to Condorcet in the legal literature
mention the voting paradox and little else. By reading through the many
ritual footnote acknowledgments to Condorcet that appear in most law
review articles on the subject, one senses that few, if any, of the authors have
actually gone back and read Condorcet.25 To the extent that authors have
looked at Condorcet's work, most of them focus upon a relatively obscure
passage on the possibility of the "cycling of voting" buried in one of
Condorcet's early essays.2 6 Even though this vote cycling passage represents
but a small part of a much longer discourse on decision-making theory, it has
arguably established the defining question for much of modem social choice
theory.
One might think that having discovered a problem as colossal as the
failure of collective democratic decision-making principles to yield correct,
consistent and stable results, Condorcet himself would have been critical of
democratic voting procedures. Modem public choice theorists surely have
Transformation of Voting Rights and Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1881 n.215 (1992) ("The
key insight is derived from an application of the 'voter's paradox,' initially developed by the French
political theorist Condorcet in the eighteenth century."); Mayton, supra note 23, at 950 ("The fact of
cyclical choices... is referred to as Condorcet's paradox, after the Marquis de Condorcet, the French
mathematician and philosopher who described this fact two hundred years ago."); Kornhauser &
Sager, supra note 23, at 12 n.22 ("Almost every discussion of voting mentions, alludes to, or focuses
on the Condorcet paradox."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing An
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (1989) ("Two centuries ago, the
Marquis de Condorcet demonstrated that majority rule cannot yield stable choice among three
alternative decisions ... In 1951, Kenneth Arrow's generalization expanded on Condorcet's example
.... "); Ulen, supra note 23, at 205-06 n.18 ("This possibility of circular group preferences in majority
voting was first noted by Condorcet (1743-1794) and is sometimes called the 'Condorcet paradox.'
Note that Arrow's theorem is a generalization of this well-known paradox.").
25. This is not to criticize these authors. In the first place, the origin of the voting paradox was
not the primary focus of these articles. In addition, much of Condorcet's original work is not readily
available and much of it has not been translated into English. Similar observations were made in
MCLEAN & HEwlTr, supra note 21, at viii ("[B]arriers to studying Condorcet in the original have
remained high. Most social choice theorists do not read French; most Enlightenment scholars do not
know any social choice. Condorcet has therefore not received his due in either camp.").
26. Condorcet's discussion of the voting paradox appears in Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at
52-56.
[VOL. 76:975
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taken Condorcet's discovery in this direction, using the voting paradox and
related social choice findings as a basis for critiquing modem majority vote
decision rules.27 Given that unanimity rules impose costs that make such
rules impractical, many public choice scholars advocate a rather "libertarian"
approach, leaving most decision making to the private market while
proposing a significantly reduced role for government.
Ironically, the so-called father of social choice theory is more aptly
described as a civic republican. Civic republicans challenge the notion that
group decision making simply involves a tallying of immutable, individual
preferences. Instead, the deliberative quality of the decision-making process
itself may change preferences and make consensus more achievable.29
Although viewed as the father of an analytic tradition now used to question
the legitimacy of democratic systems operating under majority vote decision
rules, Condorcet in his own work went on to expand such notions of
democratic decision making. A return to this eighteenth century source
reveals that, taken out of context, Condorcet's vote cycling passage seriously
misrepresents Condorcet's potential contribution to the modem discourse.
The motivation for this Article is to understand how and why, having
discovered the voting paradox in 1785, Condorcet actually became a more
ardent believer in democratic decision making in later writings until his
unfortunate death in 1794. More importantly, this Article examines
Condorcet's discovery of the voting paradox in the larger context of his life's
work to determine what solutions to the paradox he might have seen that
modem social choice theorists and the legal literature have not fully
explored.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the history and implications of
27. See, e.g., RIKER, supra note 13, at 67 (using Condorcet's findings to challenge as
"profoundly dubious" the notion that "majority decision is fair and reasonable in its logical structure");
William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation ofLegislative Choice: The Political
Consequences ofJudicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373, 385 (1988).
28. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 202 (1962) (citing unanimity as the
"ideally efficient," but high cost, solution and suggesting that "majority voting will tend to cause
overinvestment in the public sector relative to the private sector").
29. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunnstein, Republican
Revival]. Both of these essays appear as part of a useful symposium of work on republicanism. See
also Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter
Sunnstein, Interest Groups]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and is it Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Frank L Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreward:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces]. For a more
recent treatment, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). See also, e.g., infra notes 79-83, 115-31 and accompanying text.
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social choice theory and the famous voting paradox. Part I first offers a
general picture of Condorcet's life and work. It then explores the connections
between the philosophies of Condorcet, Rousseau and the more modem civic
republican traditions. Part IV takes a closer took at Condorcet's original
decision-making theory. Part V uncovers many civic republican themes
within the context of the larger body of Condorcet's work and uses these
themes to explore what his work might contribute to the modem discourse.
A broader look at Condorcet's lifetime work reveals that Condorcet's
solution to the paradox would be to focus attention primarily on the quality
of inputs to the legislative process by improving the quality of education and
deliberation. Moreover, he would urge giving up the obsessive search for the
perfect vote aggregating mechanism, since such a mechanism does not exist.
Instead, Condorcet would have advocated a probabalistic approach in
developing procedures most likely to increase the probability of "correct" or
"true" outcomes.
II. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY AND THE FAMOUS VOTING PARADOX
A. BriefHistory of Social Choice Theory
The vintage of social choice theory and its logical connection to
democratic theory is rather recent. The theory takes its name from Kenneth
Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, first published in 1951.30 The
beginnings of modem social choice theory, however, date back to the
"rediscovery" of the voting paradox by Duncan Black in the 1940s. 31 In turn,
Black traces the original discovery of the paradox to Condorcet and de
Borda, both members of the French Academy of Sciences in the eighteenth
century.32 Black also notes the contributions of Rev. C. L. Dodgson, more
30. The first edition of Arrow's book makes no reference to Condorcet. In notes added to the
second edition in 1963, Arrow confessed "to a certain want of diligence in tracking down the historical
origins of the theories of social choice." He adds that he has since been made aware that "the paradox
was known and developed by the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth century.... This
development was part of Condorcet's great interest in methods of election and essentially, therefore, in
the theory of social choice." ARROW, supra note 6, at 93.
31. See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF CoMMIrTEEs AND ELECTIONS 46-51 (1958). In his
Preface, Duncan Black notes that the 1958 book grew from an earlier series of essays he wrote in the
1940s and himself confessed that "[w]hen I first attempted publication I was unacquainted with the
earlier history of the theory, and, indeed, did not even know that it had a history .... Id. at xi. Part II
of the 1958 book is devoted to discussing the early history of the "Mathematical Theory of
Committees and Elections." Id. at 156-88; see also RIKER, supra note 13, at 1-2 (attributing the
launching of social choice theory to Black's "rediscovery" of the voting paradox).
32. See BLACK, supra note 31, at 156-80. Condorcet and de Borda were apparently members of
opposing camps within the Academy. See KEITH MICHAEL BAKER, CONDORCET: FROM NATURAL
[VOL. 76:975
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/3
TRUTH AND PROBABILITY
commonly known by his pseudonym, Lewis Carroll, who "wrote extensively
on committees, elections, and proportionate representation. ' 33
The simplest voting decisions involve two distinct options-diners choose
between mushrooms and anchovies; voters choose between Candidates X
and Y; legislators choose between Policies 1 and 2; judges choose between
Outcomes A and B. For most of these simple, binary choices, majority voting
rules generate clear and consistent results.3 4 Unfortunately, many legislative
and juridical choices cannot neatly be reduced to two options. Condorcet,
Arrow and social choice theorists generally address their attention to these
more complex collective choices.
In the next simplest case to a binary choice, that of three choices,
Condorcet observed some potentially strange results. He first noticed that in
three-way choices, a traditional majority voting mechanism could result in "a
decision really contrary to the opinion of the majority;" 35 in other words,
arguably an inauthentic result.36 In the inauthentic results case, Condorcet at
least had a proposed solution, an alternative voting mechanism that would
lead to an authentic result.3 7 Even more disturbing than the soluble
inauthentic results case, Condorcet found that the outcome of majority voting
in a second category of cases would differ depending upon the order in which
options were presented (pairwise) for a vote; in other words, inconsistent or
unstable results.39 However, unlike the inauthentic results case, Condorcet
found no obvious or simple solution to the inconsistent results case. One
response to the inconsistent results case is to argue that it may be only a
PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL MATHEMATICS (1975).
33. BLACK. supra note 31, at 189. Dodgson apparently became interested in these issues as a
result of controversial committee elections within the Christ Church. Black's book includes a reprint of
Dodgson's major essays on the subject of elections, the only known copies of which are held at the
Princeton University Library. See id. at 214-38.
34. One exception is the case of an even number of voters and an equal number of votes for each
of two simple propositions. In such a case, some tiebreaking mechanism will be necessary to reach a
decision. Another exception is a voting rule that permits abstentions. If some voters abstain, the
collective choice might not reflect the true will of the majority.
35. Condorcet, Essay. supra note 21, at 53.
36. See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
37. This solution is now known as the "Condorcet winner" or the "Condorcet criterion." Roughly
stated, Condorcet's solution requires taking up all possible pairwise comparisons of the alternative
choices and adopting as a group decision the choice that beats all others in pairwise comparisons. See
infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
38. See Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 55.
39. See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text. The labels, inauthentic and inconsistent or
unstable, are the author's own. Unfortunately, the legal literature often implies that there is only one
voting paradox, leading to some confusion. However, a number of different paradoxes of voting exist,
the most troubling of which is the inconsistent results case. It is this troubling case that stimulates most
social choice theory.
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theoretical problem if the cyclical preference distribution case does not
appear with great frequency.40 Unfortunately, several theorists suggest that
cyclical preference structures may be prevalent.41
B. Arrow's Elaboration
In his Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow set out to determine
whether "it is formally possible to construct a procedure for passing from a
set of known individual tastes to a pattern of social decision making, the
procedure in question being required to satisfy certain natural conditions.
'A2
In other words, Arrow was asking whether any procedure43 exists to translate
individual choices into a group decision that meets certain basic conditions of
rationality. 4 Moreover, Arrow was asking whether such a procedure exists
that would work for any possible distribution of choices among the decision
makers. In short, Arrow's answer was no. Before launching his formal
mathematical proof, Arrow illustrated the problem by describing the "well-
known 'paradox of voting.
'
,AS
The now familiar example can be briefly summarized. Imagine that a
decision must be made regarding the location of a nuclear waste disposal
facility. The three possibilities presented to the decision-making body are:
State X, State Y or State Z. The legislators are divided into three equal groups
with the following preferences:
40. For a general discussion of cyclical majorities, see BLACK, supra note 31, at 46-51. For a
concise and useful description of the basic paradox as applied in the political context, see RIKER, supra
note 13, at 16-19.
41. See, e.g. PIKER, supra note 13, at 188; infra note 58 and accompanying text.
42. ARROW, supra note 6, at 2.
43. Arrow called the procedure he sought a "social welfare function," defined simply as a
process or rule for creating a social ordering from individual sets of preferences. ARROW, supra note 6,
at 23.
44. Arrow first establishes two background assumptions or axioms: 1) connectedness-for any
two alternatives (x and y) x will either be preferred or indifferent to y or y will be preferred or
indifferent to x; 2) transitivi,--for all x, y and z, if x is preferred to y andy is preferred to z, then x is
preferred to z. See ARROW, supra note 6, at 13. To these background axioms, Arrow added four
additional conditions: 1) unrestricted scope-an acceptable social welfare function should be able to
process any coherent set of individual preference ranking or any number of choices; 2) unanimity-if
all individuals rank x over y, then the social ordering should rank x over y; 3) nondictatorship-the
preference of any one individual should not automatically become the social choice of the group; 4)
independence of irrelevant alternatives-the group choice from a given environment should depend
only on the ordering of individuals among the alternatives in a given environment. A reasonably
accessible discussion of these axioms and conditions appears in ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S
THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE-A CASE STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 6-
9 (1980). See also FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 178-195.
45. ARROW, supra note 6, at 2. The reference here is to the inconsistent results or no-winner
form of the paradox illustrated by Condorcet. See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
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Group 1: prefers State Xto Yto Z;
Group 2: prefers State Y to Z to X;
Group 3: prefers State Z to Xto y.
46
In such cases where preferences cycle and all possibilities are placed before
the body simultaneously, no one option will obtain the vote of a majority.
Moreover, reducing the decision to simple pairwise comparisons will not
provide consistent and stable results. For example, if the first vote pairs
States X and Y, State Xwill be chosen and State Ywill be eliminated because
groups I and 3 prefer State X to Y. In a runoff between States X and Z, State
Z will be chosen because groups 2 and 3 prefer State Z to X.
Imagine now that the agenda presents the pairwise votes differently. If the
first vote paired States X and Z, State Z would have been chosen, since
groups 2 and 3 prefer State Z to X. Now the runoff between States Z and Y
will result in the choice of State Y, since groups 1 and 2 prefer State Y to Z.
Given this different agenda, State Y is declared the winner-the State that
actually lost the first round and was out of the running under the first agenda!
In other words, there is no clear majority for any one outcome; this particular
distribution of preferences yields inconsistent or "contradictory" results.47
The case involving this particular cycled distribution of preferences is the
real problem case: the famous voting paradox.
C. Implications of Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory acknowledges that outcomes can vary with the
particular voting method adopted. If so, those with control over the agenda or
procedures are in a position to intentionally manipulate results. Moreover,
agenda influence can even be "an artifact of process features adopted with
the most outcome-neutral intentions."48 In either case, the results are
disturbing. In addition, if voters know the particular preferences of other
voters, they can strategically manipulate the outcome by voting insincerely in
46. Some variation of this particular hypothetical with a cycled distribution of preferences among
three voters or groups of voters almost always appears in literature on the voting paradox. See, e.g.
ARROW, supra note 6, at 2-3 (choice between disarmament, cold war and hot war); Easterbrook, supra
note 12, at 815 (choice between absolutist, neutral and balancing approach to First Amendment cases);
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 39
(1991) (choice between three locations for a federal facility); RIKER, supra note 13, at 16-19 (generic
choice between alternatives x, y and z); Steams, supra note 22, at 1238 (choice between chocolate,
coffee and vanilla ice cream cake).
47. See Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 52,55.
48. Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV.
561, 589 (1977); see also Riker & Weingast, supra note 27, at 385 ("When a [voting] cycle exists, any
alternative can, via an appropriate agenda, become the final outcome.").
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the early rounds. Imagine that group I in the above hypothetical is made up
of State Zresidents, who cannot bear the thought of a nuclear facility located
in their state. Neighboring State Y also is not their ideal choice. Instead, they
prefer State X, the state that is farthest from them. If they know the
preference distribution of the other groups, they can predict that State X will
win in the first contest with State Y. In the runoff between States X and Z,
they can see the writing on the wall-State Zwill be the choice of the group.
Even though their true preference is for State X over Y, if they vote for State
Yin the first round, State X (their first choice) will be eliminated. Now in the
runoff between States Y and Z, State Y will be the collective choice of the
group. By voting strategically in this way, group 1 will only get its second
choice but will at least have escaped its least favored result.
Clearly, the potential for such strategic manipulation of outcomes through
insincere voting is another disturbing implication of the voting paradox.49
Perhaps most disturbing, the above implications are not limited to majority
rule procedures. Indeed, "Arrow shows that Condorcet-like paradoxes are not
a peculiar property of [simple] majority rule; instead, they afflict a very broad
class of initially attractive decision procedures." 50
The voting paradox literature from other social science disciplines has
had a profound effect on the legal liturature. For example, Erwin
Chemerinsky notes, "Social choice theorists have demonstrated reasons why
multi-member bodies cannot accurately aggregate preferences and reflect
majority wishes. The famous Arrow Impossibility Theorem, for example,
questions whether 'any process could even hope to 'reflect' any such thing as
the will of the majority."' 51 Given these social choice findings, Chemerinsky
questions the extent to which the Supreme Court has adopted a constitutional
interpretation paradigm under which it frequently defers to the majoritarian
legislature.52 He argues that less deference to majoritarian legislatures would
leave judicial panels with a more active role. On the other hand, since judicial
49. For a discussion of issues related to such strategic voting, see, for example, RIKER, supra
note 13, at 137-168.
50. ACKERMAN, supra note 23, at 293.
51. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreward: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 79-80 (1989); see also David Luban, Social Choice Theory as
Jurisprudence, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 521 (1996) ("The theorem poses an immense challenge to
democratic theory. It was a sensational result."); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 16, at 2124 ("legal
and political theorists have struck at the heart of democratic justification by charging that democracy
itself is incapable of producing meaningful or rational results").
52. See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 99; see also Riker & Weingast, supra note 27, at 398-401(questioning extreme judicial deference to majority legislative decisions); Lynn A. Stout, Strict
Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1794-95, 1822 (1992).
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panels generally decide cases by majority vote, cycled distributions of
opinion preferences among judges on the panel arguably also can result in
arbitrary, unstable or inconsistent decisions. Frank Easterbrook, for example,
uses the voting paradox to explain that inconsistency in Supreme Court
opinions is inevitable. 3 Moreover, he raises vote cycling as an argument
against stare decisis in situations involving three or more plausible legal
positions. Given that the outcome in particular cases may differ depending
upon the order in which issues are presented to the Court, Easterbrook
concludes, "To invoke stare decisis to close the debate after the first case is to
make the choice of constitutional doctrine essentially arbitrary."
54
D. Challenges to the Voting Paradox
1. Empirical Challenges
Since Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, many scholars have
sought to minimize the potentially devastating blows to democratic decision-
making theory in several different ways. Taking an empirical approach, some
have examined the likelihood and frequency of vote cycling,55 seeking to
establish that the problem is not as great as it first appears. With regard to this
approach, it is important to distinguish the theoretical analysis of when cycles
can occur from the practical analysis of when cycles do occur. The latter type
of research is difficult because information about the actual distribution of
voters' preferences is often not available.56 Unfortunately, even the largely
53. See Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 813 ("Inconsistency is inevitable,... no matter how much
the Justices may disregard their own preferences, no matter how carefully they may approach their
tasks, no matter how skilled they may be."); see also Steams, supra note 22, at 1257-1285; FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 55 ("If chaos and incoherence are the inevitable outcomes of majority
voting, then appellate courts (which invariably have multiple members and majority voting rules) and
even the 1787 Constitutional Convention are equally bankrupt."). For a critique of Easterbrook's
application of the voting paradox to judicial decision-making, see Komhauser & Sager, supra note 2,
at 97-102. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government,
75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 957-58 (1990); Komhauser & Sager, supra note 23, at 24-33; David Post &
Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO.
L.J. 743 (1992).
54. Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 818.
55. See, e.g., Gehrlein, supra note 23, at 164 ("The current study concerns itself with the simplest
of all questions about Condorcet's paradox, specifically, 'How likely is the paradox to occur?"').
56. See id. at 165. For theoretical research, see, for example, id. at 192 (concluding that "the
probability of the no-winner form of Condorcet's paradox increases as the number of dimensions in
the attribute space increases"); PIKER, supra note 13, at 188 (concluding that majority rule is almost
always in disequilibrium). Riker discusses the theoretical frequency of cycles. See id. at 119-23; see
also Frank DeMeyer & Charles R. Plott, The Probability of a Cyclical Majority, 38 ECONOMETRICA
345 (1970).
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theoretical literature with regard to the frequency of cycling is inconclusive.57
For example, while political scientist William Riker concluded that cycling is
pervasive,58 economist Gordon Tullock concluded that cycling is rare.59
2. Structure-Induced Equilibria
Several theorists have noted that despite the pessimistic predictions of
inconsistency and chaos suggested by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem,
democratic decision making through legislative voting appears to be
remarkably stable.60 One explanation for this result is that legislative
processes impose "structure-induced equilibrium." For example, the two-
party system often limits the number of choices so as to avoid complex
decisions involving multiple options; many decisions are presented as simple
binary choices. 61 Another structure-induced equilibrium is logrolling, in
which one legislator agrees to vote the preference of another in exchange for
a promise that the other will vote the first legislator's preference on a
different matter.
Similar structure-induced equilibrium may also affect jury and judicial
panel decisions, which are often reduced to a binary choice between
judgment for the plaintiff or for the defendant.62 On the other hand, at least
with respect to Supreme Court decisions, Easterbrook observes that "many
legal problems admit of three or more plausible legal positions, and the
method of the Justices' appointment ensures that most plausible legal
57. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note at 5, at 6 (noting a "discrepancy between the faith that
practitioners place in rational choice theory and its failure to deliver empirically"); id. at 11-12
("persuasive evidence has not been adduced to sustain Riker and Weingast's claim that the possibility
of cycles is often realized in actual legislatures"). A balanced discussion of the literature on both sides
appears in GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 107-20. See also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 16, at
2136 nA6 (literature cited).
58. See RIKER, supra note 13, at 188 ("[fIor the amalgamation of an extremely wide variety of
individual value structures ... by majority rule under fair procedures, intransitivities almost always
exist and cycles include the whole space of political possibilities."); Riker & Weingast, supra note 27,
at 393-98.
59. See Gordon Tullock, Why So Much Stability, 37 PUB. CHOICE 189 (1981) ("If we look at the
real world, ... we observe not only is there no endless cycling, but acts, are passed with reasonable
dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time."); Grofinan, supra note 24, at 1553
("Cycles are much harder to find than early Social Choice models suggest they ought to be. Indeed,
hunting for the paradox is much like hunting for the Loch Ness monster appearances are few and far
between, and some of the sightings are suspect." (footnotes omitted)).
60. See, e.g., Tullock, supra note 59; FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 48; Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent andPublic Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 429-32 (1988).
61. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry I Weingast Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981).
62. See Komhauser & Sager, supra note 2, at 109 n.37.
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positions find some support on the Court."63
Structure-induced equilibria and related phenomena in legislative and
judicial decision making begin to suggest that judgment aggregations may be
more stable than pure preference aggregations. For example, Professor
Herbert Hovenkamp argues that in the legislative arena, consensus is likely to
emerge from what he calls "cardinality-producing processes." These
cardinality-producing mechanisms include: shared ideological perceptions,
compelling scientific models, objective welfare judgments, cost-benefit
analysis and logrolling.64 As an example, he notes that in determining proper
speed limits (a judgment aggregation) "legislative committees look at
accident statistics, not at the preferences of those on the highways."
65
Assuming that all legislators believe the accident statistics are valid,
consensus may emerge around such objective information. Given this
objective welfare judgment about proper speed limits, a cyclical distribution
of voting positions is unlikely. Unlike pure preference aggregations,
legislators in such cases come to agree upon an answer they believe to be
correct.
66
A related explanation for the perceived stability of voting is that
preference distributions often actually fall on a single continuum. In politics,
one might think of this as the "left-righf continuum. Duncan Black argued
that, despite the voting paradox, when individual preferences can be plotted
along a single dimensional scale, majority rule does result in consistent and
stable group choices. If preference distributions have the characteristic of
"single-peakedness" or "uni-peakedness," each individual can locate his or
her first choice on a continuum from left to right. The farther away an
alternative is from the voter's first choice, the less it will be preferred.67 Put
63. Easterbrook. supra note 12, at 816.
64. See Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 955-60. Hovenkamp notes that Arrow's independence of
irrelevant alternatives condition defines "a social choice mechanism that is completely ordinal in its
weightings of preferences." Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 953. Under this condition, one voter cannot
take into account the preferences of others. Moreover, preferences with regard to one set of issues
should not be relevant in deciding another set of issues. Hovenkamp argues that Arrow's theorem is
not appropriately applied to legislative decision making. In so doing, he identifies several cardinality-
producing processes in the legislative arena that violate Arrow's independence condition. To the extent
that these mechanisms are prevalent, consensus is more likely to emerge, making legislative decisions
more stable than Arrow's theorem would have us believe. Hovenkamp's cardinality-producing
mechanisms are similar to what others would call structure-induced equilibria.
65. Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 959.
66. Condorcet's use of probability theory to develop mechanisms to increase the probability of
correct judgments is discussed infra notes 90, 126-28, 138-46 and accompanying text.
67. See BLACK, supra note 31, at 14-24 (A Committee Using a Simple Majority: Single-Peaked
Preference Curves") see also RIKER, supra note 13, at 124-28. ("If, by reason of discussion, debate,
civic education, and political socialization, voters have a common view of the political dimension (as
evidenced by single-peakedness), then a transitive outcome is guaranteed.")
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differently, "a group of preference rankings is single-peaked if there is some
one of the choice alternatives concerning which all voters agree that it is not
the worst."68 Given this type of preference distribution, a majority vote
represents the legitimate, albeit compromise, decision of the group.
Although political preferences may often fall on a "left-right" continuum,
legal positions taken by different judges on a judicial panel in a complex case
may be less likely to fall along such a continuum. As Easterbrook noted with
respect to Supreme Court decisions, "legal disputes often require choices in
many dimensions. A given constitutional case may require the Court to
consider the intersection of several provisions, each embodying several
values and each with a distinctive structure. There are at least as many
dimensions of choice as there are values (or provisions) in question."69 On
the other hand, Hovenkamp argues that, despite the multiple plausible legal
positions in many cases, judges are constrained by common legal rules,
making movement of the judicial panel in one direction more likely than
another. In other words, Easterbrook may be wrong about the extent to which
judicial decision making involves cyclical distributions. Consensus is more
likely than he imagines.70 In the end, the extent to which structure-induced
equilibria or other factors lead to stability in legislative and judicial decision
making cannot be known. Cyclical distributions of vote preferences surely
may exist in both worlds. Unfortunately, the implications of Arrow's theorem
for legislative and judicial decision making cannot be avoided simply by
arguing that the problem does not come up.
3. Challenging Arrow's Axioms
Other attempts to minimize the social choice blows to democratic
decision rules involve a tactical strike challenging one or more of the
conditions that Arrow requires for a proper vote aggregating mechanism.
71
Of Arrow's axioms, two are difficult to challenge: unanimity and
nondictatorship. If all individuals prefer a particular choice, most will agree
that the group should adopt that choice. In addition, most will agree that the
preference of one individual should not automatically become the group's
68. MACKAY, supra note 44, at 28.
69. Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 826. ("[M]any disputes are characterized by three choices held
[by the Justices] in multi-peaked ways.... Multi-peakedness becomes more and more likely as the
number of dimensions of choice increases."); cf Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 957-58; Kornhauser &
Sager, supra note 2, at 107-09.
70. See Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 957-58 (arguing that Easterbrook might have a point if the
ranking ofJudges' preferences was purely random and not constrained by common legal rules).
71. Seesupra note44.
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choice. But some economists and political scientists have played with
relaxing or eliminating the remaining conditions necessary to Arrow's
proof 72 For example, some would eliminate the independence of irrelevant
alternatives condition, arguing that, at least in the legislative arena, a voter's
preferences with respect to one item on the agenda may vary based on
preferences with regard to another agenda item.73 Others have suggested
relaxing the transitivity requirement. If a group prefers X to Y and Y to Z,
transitivity requires that the group prefer X to Z. Any other result is
considered illogical and inconsistent.74 Arrow proved that a cyclical
distribution of individual voter preferences can lead to just such intransitive
group results. Some have suggested "replacing Arrow's notion of collective
rationality with the requirement that the social decision process be fair. 75
Despite these efforts to relax or eliminate one or more of Arrow's conditions,
many analysts agree that Arrow's requirements are rather modest. Arrow's
Theorem remains a stubborn thorn in the side for many advocates of
democratic decision-making mechanisms.
E. Civic Republican Response to the Voting Paradox
In light of the social choice challenges to collective democratic decision-
making procedures, social and public choice scholars have suggested that
general consensus or unanimity is the ideal.76 For example, James Buchanan
and Gordon Tullock argue, "At best, majority rule should be viewed as one
among many practical expedients made necessary by the costs of securing
widespread agreement on political issues when individual and group interests
diverge.' 77 Because they consider the costs of reaching such agreement as
wasteful, Buchanan and Tullock contend that collective activity generally
72. For a summary of various efforts to relax or eliminate Arrow's axioms, see MUELLER, supra
note 5, at 388-99.
73. See. e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 53. Condorcet himself arguably relaxed the independence
of irrelevant alternatives axiom in his proposed solution to the voting paradox. See id.; infra note 165.
74. Mueller points out that the transitivity requirement "is motivated in part by the desire to
avoid the embarrassment of inconsistency and arbitrariness." MUELLER, supra note 5, at 391.
75. Id.; see also M.C. Kemp, Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem, 21 REv. OF ECON. STUD.
240 (1953/1954).
76. For an early version of the "unanimity as ideal" argument, see KNUT WICKSELL, A NEW
PRINCIPLE FOR JUST TAXATION (1896), reprinted in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 72-
118 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., 3d ed. 1967). For social and public choice
scholars, unanimity is the ideal because it is the only clearly authentic aggregation of individual
preferences into a group decision. Republicans may also conclude that unanimity is ideal, but for
different reasons. Rousseau, for example, suggests that "the nearer opinion approaches unanimity, the
greater is the dominance of the general will." 4 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
AND DISCOURSES 276 (G.D.H. Cole ed., 1913) [hereinafter THE SOCIAL CONTRACT].
77. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 96.
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should be organized in the "smallest units consistent with the extent of the
externality that the collectivization is designed to eliminate."7 In other
words, they advocate that as many decisions as possible be made by
appropriate private groups and at the state and local level.
While public choice theorists generally see government "as nothing more
than the set of processes, the machine, which allows such collective action to
take place," the more organic conception of society and government reflected
by civic republicanism sees the individual as part of a larger whole for which
there is a "common good.' 79 Comparing the social or public choice vision
with the civic republican vision of government, Professors Farber and
Frickey observe:
In public choice, government is merely a mechanism for combining
preferences into a social decision. The preferences themselves remain
untouched. In republican thought, private preferences are secondary;
they are if anything the products of government action rather than its
inputs. As compared with public choice, republicanism views the role
of government as far more creative. Rather than mechanically
processing preferences, government involves an intellectual search for
the morally correct answer.80
Thus, civic republicans challenge the very notion that political decision
making is, or should be, the simple aggregation of individual preferences.
Instead, they view the political process not simply as an instrument for the
aggregation of preferences, but rather as a process for the "transformation of
preferences through public and rational discussion." 8' The literature on civic
republicanism attempts to revitalize the deliberative quality or "dialogic
tradition' 82 of public decision making.
Although civic republicanism is hard to define precisely and does not
mean the same thing even to those who claim to be civic republicans, one can
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id. at 13.
80. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 44.
81. Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS
OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103, 112 (Jon Elster & Aunund Hylland eds., 1986); see also Sunnstein,
Interest Groups, supra note 29, at 31 (The republican view of politics "was not a scheme in which
people impressed their private preferences on the government. It was instead a system in which the
selection of preferences was the object of the governmental process. Preferences were not to be taken
as exogenous, but to be developed and shaped through politics."); Sunnstein, Republican Revival,
supra note 29, at 1549 ("Republicans are thus unlikely to take existing preferences and entitlements as
fixed. Both are permissible objects of political deliberation.'); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 46, at
61-62 ("a viable democracy requires that preferences be shaped by public discourse and processed by
political institutions so that meaningful decisions can emerge").
82. See supra note 29.
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identify common themes. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein identifies
four central principles of liberal republicanism: 1) "deliberation in politics,
made possible by ... civic virtue;" 2) "equality of political actors;" 3)
"universalism, exemplified by the notion of a common good, and made
possible by 'practical reason;' and 4) "citizenship, manifesting itself in
broadly guaranteed rights of participation."
3
Condorcet, the so-called father of social choice, incorporates all four of
these principles in his overall work. Ironically, Condorcet himself would be
better described as a civic republican.84 Condorcet surely would agree with
Farber and Frickey that the role of government should be far more creative
than the simple aggregation of preferences. This is not to suggest that
Condorcet completely abandoned the search for appropriate decision-making
mechanisms and procedures.85 Nor is it to suggest that government should
necessarily be more involved in regulating people's personal lives.
Condorcet was a strong believer in the liberty of the individual.
86
Nevertheless, Condorcet had an abiding faith in government and the potential
for reasoned decisions arrived at through majority voting decision rules.
III. CONDORCET IN CONTEXT
A. The Early Period-Before the Revolution8 7
Condorcet was born into nobility in 1743. Rejecting his family's wish that
he follow a career in the military or the clergy, Condorcet instead began his
professional career as a mathematician and, at the age of twenty-six, was
83. Sunnstein, Republican Revival, supra note 29, at 1541.
84. For further discussion of the relationship between Condorcet's thought and that of the civic
republicans, see infra notes 115-31, 172-231 and accompanying text.
85. In his later work, particularly his proposed constitution, Condorcet focused on detailed voting
mechanisms that provided the greatest probability of truth. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying
text.
86. Condorcet's thoughts about individual liberty are discussed briefly infra notes 111-14 and
accompanying text.
87. The most comprehensive biography of Condorcet is available only in French. LtON CAIEN,
CONDORCET ET LA RtVOLUTION FRANCAISE (1904). The most comprehensive treatment in English is
BAKER, supra note 32. See also ANNE ELIZABETH BURLINGAME, CONDORCET: THE TORCHBEARER OF
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1930); SALWYN SCHAPIRO, CONDORCET AND THE RISE OF LIBERALISM
(1934). Interesting chapters on Condorcet's life and work also appear in FRANK E. MANUEL, THE
PROPHETS OF PARIS 53-102 (1962); BRUCE MAZLiSH, THE RIDDLE OF HISTORY 70-100 (1966). One of
Condorcet's roles as Secretary for the Academy of Sciences was to author eulogies of its eminent
members, a task he apparently undertook with great elegance and style. Another rather comprehensive
source of biographic information is the eulogy of Condorcet himself, presented to the Academy by M.
Arago. M. Arago, Condorcet: A Biography, in SMITHSONIAN INST. ANN. REP. 180-235 (1879)
[hereinafter Biography]. Much of the biographic information that follows was drawn from an amalgam
of these sources.
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elected to the prestigious Academy of Science in Paris, eventually serving as
its permanent secretary. He was later sponsored by Voltaire and ultimately
elected to the Academie Frangaise ("French Academy") in 1782.8
Condorcet was a faithful disciple of Voltaire and Turgot during the French
Enlightenment-the "age of reason." Unfortunately, as noted by one
historian of the French Enlightenment, "It was Condorcet's misfortune to be
a lesser luminary at a time when the great lights of the philosophe movement
dazzled the intellectual skies of France."89
As a product of the Enlightenment, Condorcet adopted a highly scientific
approach to the social sciences, and "by utilizing the calculus of probabilities
in the social sciences he proposed to 'mathematize' social phenomena and
finally to introduce predictability and law into the science of man." 90 During
the turmoil of the 1770s that ultimately led to the French Revolution,
Condorcet was a member of the French intellectual philosophes, a loosely-
defined group advocating social, political and economic reforms. Among the
major publication projects of the philosophes was a seventeen volume
encyclopedia published between 1751 and 1765. More than just an
encyclopedia, this massive work represented to many a "manifesto of the
mind,"91 a reflection of enlightenment thought. Condorcet made several
contributions to L "Encylopidie on science and mathematics.
Although irreverent,92 the philosophes generally believed in reform
through peaceful means. During the period of his early work, Condorcet still
believed that the best form of government was the enlightened monarch, who
might rule with greater fairness and reason than the masses might rule
themselves through popular government. In 1774, the French philosophes
had high hopes for peaceful reform when Louis XVI appointed Turgot, one
88. See BAKER, supra note 32, at 27.
89. SCHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 271. See also CONDORCET STUDIES I ix (Lenora Cohen
Rosenfield ed., 1984) (Foreward by Richard H. Popkin) ("Condorcet is an extremely interesting
thinker whose ideas are most relevant to present day concerns. Unfortunately, his work has not been
given the attention it deserves.") [hereinafter CONDORCET STUDIES]. Condorcet was included in a
volume of "neglected biography" published in 1800. Thomas Bensley, The Annual Necrology, for
1797-8, Including Also, Various Articles of Neglected Biography, vol. 3, 88-105 (1800)
90. MANUEL, supra note 87, at 94. Condorcet's particular emphasis on social mathematics and
probability theory goes a long way toward explaining the different trajectories of his work as opposed
to social choice theory. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
91. MANUEL, supra note 87, at 97. Rousseau also made contributions to L 'Encylopddie. For a
discussion of connections between Condorcet and Rousseau, see infra notes 117-28 and accompanying
text.
92. See R.J. WHITE, THE ANTI-PHILOSOPHERS: A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHES IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY FRANCE 4 (1970) (Thephilosophes were "distinctive if only because of their community in
opposition to the ancien regime, their wholly irreverent temper, their contempt or neglect of the faith
and intellect of their forefathers, of all that was old and long-established, in short their 'infidelity."),
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of their own, as Minister of Finance (Comptroller-General). Turgot, in turn,
appointed his disciple Condorcet as Inspector of the Mint. In 1776, Turgot
proposed six edicts aimed at major reform focused upon open markets and
free trade. These reforms included elimination of the old corporate guilds,
opening of markets to free trade, elimination of the corvges, a type of forced
labor by which peasants were required to build and maintain provincial
roads, and providing a universal, public education system. Unfortunately,
Turgot's edicts failed and he was forced to resign. In 1776, when Turgot
resigned, a despondent Condorcet resigned as well.93
B. Condorcet and the French Revolution
Condorcet is thought to be a unique transitional figure in the French
philosophe movement because he was the only philosophe to actively
participate in the French Revolution. 94 By 1776, Condorcet had already
begun to question the viability of enlightened monarchy. In 1785, when he
wrote his famous Essay noting the voting paradox, Condorcet still supported
the ancien rdgime, albeit with more hesitancy. He later "ceased to be a
constitutional monarchist, and became an ardent advocate of a democratic
republic, based upon universal, equal suffrage."95 Despite his roots in
nobility, Condorcet came to be a passionate and well-respected republican.
96
No doubt, Condorcet was heavily influenced by events taking place in the
American colonies.97 As noted by one commentator, "Condorcet's interest in
93. After resigning his position, Condorcet went back to focusing on the affairs of the Academy
of Science. In a letter to Voltaire, Condorcet referred to his return to purely academic work: "[i]t is sad
to be working only for vanity after laboring with pride for the public good." Letter from Condorcet to
Voltaire, cited in Ren~e Waldinger, Condorcet: The Problematic Nature of Progress, in CONDORCET
STUDIES, supra note 89, at 117, 119.
94. See CONDORCET STUDIES, supra note 89, at 1; BURLINGAME, supra note 87, at 5 ("of all the
philosophes his life alone runs straight and well defined from those early, happy days of intellectual
discussion and projected reform with a restored and reconstructed France shining clear as the goal, to
the stark tragedy of a blood-mad Paris rabble").
95. SCHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 87. There is some difference of opinion as to how radical these
changes of view were. See CAHEN, supra note 87, at 137-38 (the storming of the Bastille produced in
his mind a veritable revolution). But see BAKER, supra note 32, at 267-69; MAURICE CRANSTON,
PHILOSOPHERS AND PAMPHLETEERS: POLITICAL THEORISTS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 140-41 (1986)
("there is really more continuity in Condorcet's political thinking than this romantic story would have
us believe"). Virtually all commentators agree, however, that Condorcet's views changed and matured
over time.
96. One early biography noted: "The integrity of Condorcet raised him high in the esteem of his
countrymen; as springing from the class of nobles, his disinterestedness could not be doubted.... He
was... a determined republican.... [H]e wished all to be enlightened as to their duties, and all to tend
equally to the improvement of their intellectual and moral nature." MARY SHELLY ET AL., 2 LIVES OF
THE MOST EMINENT FRENCH WRITERS 194 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1840) (1839).
97. He was later to write a major essay. See Condorcet, On the Influence of the American
1998]
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the American experiment undoubtedly had much to do with converting him
to a republican form of government."98 For example, during the period of the
American Revolution, Condorcet regularly corresponded with Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison and Benjamin Franklin and entertained them in his
home in Paris. He also developed a close friendship with Thomas Paine with
whom he founded a short-lived journal, Le R~publicain.99
In 1786, Condorcet and his new wife, Sophie de Grouchy, became
actively involved in the French Revolution, contributing daily to
revolutionary newspapers. He was among the founders of the Society of
1789, a moderate group calling for nonviolent, peaceful reforms through
democratic constitutional processes. 00 Condorcet was elected to the French
National Legislative Assembly in 1791 and later served as its President. Most
commentators date Condorcet's final rejection of the potential for an
enlightened monarchy to the July 1791 massacre of innocent citizens who
had signed a petition and gathered on the Champs de Mars in Paris
demanding abdication of King Louis XVI.1"" As President of the National
Assembly, Condorcet drafted and submitted numerous demands for reform
to the King.
In 1792, Condorcet was elected to the first French Republic's National
Convention, at which he chaired the Committee on the Constitution and was
the primary draftsman of the proposed, but ill-fated, Girondin Constitution.1
0 2
He became increasingly convinced of the need to depose the King. At the
same time, however, he firmly believed in procedural rights for the accused.
Responding to the increasing passions of the day, Condorcet urged citizens to
carefully consider the fairness of procedures for Louis XVI's trial.
0 3
Moreover, he passionately advocated abolishing the death penalty, and while
he was in favor of convicting and deposing the King, he voted against the
Revolution on Europe (1786), translated in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 71.
98. SCHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 88.
99. See id. at 89. Schapiro also notes that "the home of the Condorcets became known as lefoyer
de la Rdpublique, where republican opinions were freely expressed by radical thinkers." Id.
100. Condorcet's description of the Society's goals appears in Condorcet, On the Society of 1789
(1790), translated in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 91. For a discussion of the
Society, see BAKER, supra note 32, at 272-85.
101. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 32, at 304-05. Some sources even report that Condorcet's wife
and daughter were in the crowd and barely escaped the massacre themselves. See, e.g., MCLEAN &
HEWITr, supra note 21, at 20-2 1.
102. For a discussion of some of the particulars of the proposed constitution, see infra notes 172-
99,219-25 and accompanying texL
103. See Condorcet, Opinion sur le Jugement de Louis XVI [Opinion on the Judgment of Louis
XV], in 12 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 269. In fact, "Condorcet acted as one of the
judges of Louis XVI." Biography, supra note 87, at 217.
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King's execution.'0 4 Unfortunately, Condorcet found himself caught in a
tempest-a bitter dispute between the Girondin and the Jacobin political
parties. Although not a committed member of the Girondin camp,
105
Condorcet was considered suspect in the minds of Robespierre and other
Jacobins since he opposed the King's execution and since he chaired the
National Convention's constitutional drafting committee, a committee
largely populated with Girondin members. He was later to become a victim
of the Reign of Terror.
C. Condorcet in Hiding
When the Jacobins took control, Condorcet wrote a bitter, anonymous
pamphlet entitled Aux citoyensfrangais, sur la nouvelle constitution [Advice
to the French on the New Constitution],"6 in which he urged the French
people to reject the hastily prepared Jacobin Constitution in favor of the more
thoughtfully deliberated proposal from his drafting committee.10 7 When
Condorcet was revealed as the author of this pamphlet, the Convention called
for his arrest, and Condorcet went into hiding. During his period in hiding,
Condorcet wrote his famous Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progr~s de
'espirit humain [Sketch for the Intellectual Progress ofMankind]. "' At least
outside of the legal academy, it is this posthumously published work for
which Condorcet is most well-known.
Condorcet died in prison in March, 1794 after fleeing his hiding place in
Paris for fear that his presence there was endangering his protectors. One
important biographer notes:
The news of Condorcet's pathetic end caused considerable feeling in
the Convention, which was now stirred to compassion for the
philosophe infortun . Perhaps to atone for its act in proscribing him
the Convention ordered the publication and the distribution of
Condorcet's last work, Sketch of the Intellectual Progress ofMankind.
The book seemed like a legacy which the last of the philosophes had
104. Condorcet's elegant plea for abolishing the death penalty appears in part in 12 OEUVRES DE
CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 307.
105. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 95 ("As a member of the Convention, Condorcet was
affiliated neither with the Girondins nor with the Jacobins."); id. at 96 ("In the fierce party strife
between the Girondins and Jacobins Condorcet found that ... he was in a position of dangerous
isolation."); Biography, supra note 87, at 221 ("Condorcet ... [was] generally, 'but erroneously,'
considered a Girondist... .").
106. 12 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 653.
107. See BAKER, supra note 32, at 328-29.
108. An English translation of portions of this work appears in SELECTED WORKS, supra note 21,
at 209-82.
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left to his fellow countrymen. 0 9
Condorcet was a true intellectual, committed to the cause of human
progress and development. He was not especially interested in partisan
politics. The posthumous publication and distribution of his final work at
public expense was the belated recognition he ultimately received in his own
country for his contributions. Perhaps a more lasting tribute is that the French
educational system still bears his mark as it includes many features included
in Condorcet's earlier education proposal to the National Assembly in
1792.110
D. Condorcet the Economist
Condorcet began his government service as an economist, appointed by
Turgot. He was a passionate advocate for free markets and free trade and a
firm believer in personal liberty."' At first blush, these observations may
suggest a greater connection between Condorcet and modem social and
public choice theory, both of which are heavily grounded in free-market
economic principles. Such a suggestion is misplaced for several reasons.
First, although he may have thought of himself as an economist at earlier
points in his life, Condorcet changed his thinking substantially over time. In
his earlier days, Condorcet worked as a government economist, but his focus
later shifted towards social mathematics and political philosophy. Second,
although Condorcet advocated leaving economic decisions to the free market,
he did not necessarily believe in leaving most social and political decisions
to free markets as well. Finally, and most importantly, Condorcet's views
simply reflect the age-old tension between personal liberty (liberalism) and
legitimate, democratically-adopted restrictions on such liberty for the
common good. ' 12 Condorcet's simultaneous belief in both personal liberty
and republicanism are not inevitably inconsistent. Indeed, modem civic
republicans argue that liberalism need not be considered the antonym of
109. SCHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 107.
110. See infra notes 200-10 and accompanying text.
111. His most passionate argument for free-trade actually appears in his biography of Turgot. See
CONDORcEr, LIFE OFM. TURGOT (1787); supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 68-69 (1987) ("The republican tradition promotes the concept
of an autonomous public interest, whereas the liberal ideal holds that the public interest is simply
procedural or the sum of private interests. This issue runs throughout the nineteenth-century debates on
legal and political theory"); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 3 (1991) ("We do not yet
possess an acceptable political ideal, for reasons which belong to moral and political philosophy. The
unsolved problem is the familiar one of reconciling the standpoint of the collectivity with the
standpoint of the individual .... ").
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republicanism.'t 3 They suggest that a republican liberalism valuing both
individual freedom in most cases and the necessity for collective action in
some cases is viable and achievable.
114
E. Condorcet the Republican
Perhaps the most fundamental feature distinguishing social and public
choice theory from republican theory is that the former tends to assume that
individuals seek maximization of personal self-interest and that collective
decision-making bodies serve simply as a venue for aggregating individual
choices. Social or public choice adherents see the very notion of a "public
good" as incoherent. In fact, the voting paradox discovered by Condorcet is
often taken as confirmation that anything less than unanimous collective
decision making is arbitrary and incoherent." 5 Quite to the contrary,
republicans believe that individuals can sometimes rise above self-interest to
arrive at collective decisions in the public interest.
Condorcet truly believed that the proper role of decision-making bodies
was to arrive at the best answer, not simply to tally preferences. He saw
majority vote decision rules as necessary to provide sufficient probability
that the group decision accord with reason. For example, in his 1785 Essay,
Condorcet argued:
One can believe that since a law is useful only when it is in conformity
with reason, it is necessary to require a majority such as to give a very
great probability of the correctness of the decision .... 116
Civic republicans often attribute much of their thinking to the classical
republicanism of Montesquieu and Rousseau.' 7 Indeed, one finds in
Condorcet's work many similarities to Rousseau. This should not be
surprising as Condorcet was a young contemporary of Rousseau'18 and was
heavily influenced by the elder Rousseau's work." 9 Like Rousseau,
113. See Sunnstein, Republican Revival, supra note 29, at 1566-1571.
114. See, e.g., id.; RICHARD DAGGER, Civic VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN
LIBERALISM 11-24 (1997).
115. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
116. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 44.
117. See, e.g., Michelman, Traces, supra note 29, at 18; JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS:
A STUDY OF ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL THEORY (1969) (analyzing the connection between Rousseau and
republicanism).
118. Rousseau was born in 1712 and died in 1750 while Condorcet was born in 1743 and died in
1794.
119. For a general discussion of Rousseau's influence on Condorcet, see, for example, BAKER,
supra note 32, at 230; Bernard Grofian & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian
Perspective, 82 AM. POL. SCl. REv. 567 (1988); H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 Am.
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Condorcet described society in terms of a "social contract."'120 For example,
in his Plan for a Declaration of the Natural, Civil, and Political Rights of
Man, Condorcet begins, "The aim of every group of men who form a society
is to maintain their natural, civil, and political rights; these rights form the
basis of the social pact ....,,2
Both Rousseau and Condorcet addressed the qualities of the social pact
that make laws passed by the majority binding on the minority who voted
against them. In one of the most famous passages from Rousseau's The
Social Contract, he says:
When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is
asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but
whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will.
Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the
general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion
that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less
than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will
was not so. 122
This passage, and others like it, has generated significant controversy, some
calling Rousseau a totalitarian or "inventor of the political philosophy of
pseudo-democratic dictatorships."' 23 Others argue that he was most certainly
not a totalitarian, but was simply anxious to preserve personal liberties and
"desired no more regulation of the citizen's personal life than the common
interest imperatively demands. The most he did was insist on the
paramountcy of the general interest over all particular interests. ' 24
Although Rousseau's work has been interpreted in different ways, there is
undeniably a strong communitarian component underlying The Social
Contract. Condorcet and other republicans picked up on these
communitarian aspects of Rousseau's thought. Referring to the passage
quoted above, one scholar noted: "This ambiguous and slightly disquieting
idea was given a more satisfactory expression some twenty years later by the
POL. Scl. REV. 1231 (1988); see also David M. Estlund et al., Democratic Theory and the Public
Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1317 (1989).
120. The idea of a social contract was not new to either Rousseau or Condorcet, of course. Earlier
thinkers from Grotius to Hobbes to Locke had used the concept in varying ways. See BERTRAND
RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 629-33 (1945).
121. Condorcet, Plan for a Declaration of the Natural, Civil, and Political Rights of Man (1792),
translated in MCLEAN & HEwrrr, supra note 21, at 280.
122. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 76, at 278.
123. RUSSELL, supra note 120, at 684.
124. G.D.H. Cole, Introduction to THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 76, at xl. I choose to leave
this debate to the philosophers.
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mathematician and social philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat,
Marquis de Condorcet."'125 Putting Rousseau's communitarian ideas in more
probabalistic terms, Condorcet argued:
In general, a law which has not been voted unanimously involves
subjecting men to an opinion which is not their own, or to a decision
they believe contrary to their interest. It follows that a very great
probability of truth of this decision is the only reasonable and just
grounds according to which one demand such submission.'
26
Condorcet combined the romanticism of Rousseau with the scientific
principles prevalent in Enlightenment thinking. Unlike social and public
choice theorists, Condorcet believed in the possibility of "truth." His goal
was to use the calculus of probabilities in designing a democratic political
structure that would assure the highest probability of "true judgments." For
example, in the introduction to his famous 1785 Essay, Condorcet argued
that "it is in the interest of those who dispose of the public power to employ
that power only to sustain decisions that conform to the truth, and to give, to
the representatives they have charged to decide on their behalf, rules which
guarantee the goodness of their decisions."' 27 Most important for present
purposes, however, Condorcet sought to apply probability theory quite
broadly, arguing that social mathematics "is relevant to all our individual and
public interests," and that "almost all the opinions and judgments which
govern our conduct are based on some varying degree of probability."
1 28
Although Condorcet's primary focus in his early work was on jury trial
decisions, he later focused more specifically on political assemblies.
Looking at Condorcet's lifetime work, it becomes increasingly clear that
his was not the thinking of a social or public choice theorist. The connections
with republicanism are far greater. Condorcet was deeply committed to all
four of the civic republican principles identified by Sunstein as central to
liberal republicanism: deliberation, equality, universalism and citizenship. 129
Admittedly, there may be differences in emphasis between Condorcet and
modem civic republicans. For example, Condorcet was intensely focused on
the search for truth, whereas civic republicans seem more intensely focused
on deliberation. This difference in emphasis may not be as significant as it
125. Young. supra note 119, at 1231.
126. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 44 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 36.
128. Condorcet, A General Survey of Science Concerning the Application of Calculus to the
Political and Moral Sciences (1793), translated in MCLEAN & HEWTTr, supra note 21, at 93, 94.
129. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. A detailed discussion of Condorcet's work as
reflecting the four liberal republican principles appears infra notes 172-231 and accompanying text.
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first appears; both Condorcet and the more modem civic republicans see a
strong connection between truth and deliberation. 130 Condorcet's emphasis
on truth may strike modem ears as overly romantic or naive.131 Nevertheless,
a careful look at his work offers insights in connection with the ongoing
debate over the legitimacy of decision making by majority vote.
IV. CONDORCET'S THEORY OF ELECTIONS-A STUDY IN PROBABILITIES
AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
Condorcet's "deepest and most sustained thought' '132 on decision-making
theory arguably is found in his famous 1785 Essai sur l'application de
l'analyse t la probabilitg des dicisions rendues t lapluralitg des voix [Essay
on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making].13
Unfortunately, the Essay is not a model of clarity. It has been described as
having "obscurity and self-contradiction ... without any parallel,"'134 or as
incorporating "somewhat clumsy, complicated, even obscure mathematical
apparatus."'135 Even Condorcet himself suggested in a letter to Frederick the
Great that any attention paid to the Essay should focus on its preliminary
discourse rather than on its mathematical argument. 36 In keeping with this
suggestion, the following discussion of Condorcet's theory of elections
examines, but does not place undue emphasis on, the mathematics of the
Essay.
137
130. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
131. In this, Condorcet is not alone. Civic republicans also have been criticized as overly
romantic, naive, optimistic or utopian. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
417-18 (1990) (describing communitarians, including civic republicans, as "too utopian"); Jane B.
Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in
Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431,484 (1996) (civic republicanism "seems romantic, idealized,
even downright utopian"); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 81 (1998) ("[Tihe civic republican theory risks dismissal as naive or
panglossian."); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
801, 817 n.48 (noting parallels between "the nineteenth century utopian socialists and the modem civic
republicans").
132. BLACK, supra note 31, at 160.
133. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 33. This theory of elections, which later proved so
troubling to so many democratic theorists, actually "forms only one-tenth of the whole work." BLACK,
supra note 31, at 160.
134. ISAAC TODHUNTER, A HISTORY OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF PROBABILITY FROM
THE TIME OF PASCAL TO THAT OF LAPLACE 352 (1865).
135. WHITE, supra note 92, at 148.
136. Baker discusses the obscurity of the Essay's mathematical work and Condorcet's comments
in his May 2, 1785 letter to Frederick the Great. See BAKER, supra note 32, at 227-28.
137. In contrast to the earlier sections of this Article including historical and biographic material,
this section involves some detailed analysis of Condorcet's somewhat obscure mathematics. While I
attempt here not to be overly technical, a look at the brief portions of Condorcet's 1785 Essay
addressing voting procedures is important in understanding the development of Condorcet's response
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Condorcet's theory of elections should be understood in the larger context
of his search for certainty, truth and well-reasoned decisions.138 In fact,
Condorcet initially focused on jury decisions, concerned with increasing the
mathematical probability that an innocent person not be condemned. 139 As
later described by Duncan Black,
the intention of the Essai as a whole is to develop what may
conveniently be referred to as the jury problem, as a branch of the
theory of probability, and to do it in such a way as to obtain a Science
of Politics. A theory that would sufficiently cover the jury problem
would also be adequate, Condorcet thinks, to deal with assemblies of
any sort, e.g. parliamentary or local-government bodies.
140
Condorcet's goal was to uncover the voting or decision-making mechanism
that had the greatest probability of reaching correct outcomes. For example,
Condorcet observed that "if the probable truth of the vote of each voter is
greater than one-half, that is to say if it is more probable than not that he will
decide in conformity with the truth, the more the number of voters increases,
the greater the probability of the truth of the decision."'14 Unpacking this
observation, one can see that Condorcet was concerned with two distinct
elements: 1) the quality of each individual's input--defined as the probable
truth of each individual's vote; and 2) the quantity of votes or size of the
decision-making body. As long as the probability of correctness for each vote
was sufficiently high, the probability of correctness of the collective decision
would increase as the number of decision makers increased. This would
suggest a large assembly. Conversely, if the probability of correctness for
each vote is low, the probability of a correct outcome diminishes as the size
of the body increases. Nevertheless, Condorcet believed that large assemblies
were appropriate either in societies in the very early stages of development
where all were equally ignorant, or in societies "in which, as a result of the
progress of enlightenment, there was a great equality between minds, as to
the soundness of their judgments and the truth of the principles according to
which they governed their conduct."'142
to the voting paradox. Part V returns to the civic republican themes in Condorcet's work and considers
the lessons modem theorists might learn from Condorcet.
138. Condorcet dedicated the Essay to Monsieur Turgot "who was convinced that the truths of the
moral and political sciences are susceptible of the same certainty as those forming the system of the
physical sciences, even those branches like astronomy which seem to approach mathematical
certainty." Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 33.
139. Seeid. at36-37.
140. BLACK. supra note 31, at 163.
141. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 48-49.
142. Id. at 50.
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For the vast bulk of societies in which levels of education and
enlightenment were unequal, Condorcet in the 1785 Essay supported a less
numerous assembly. At the same time, he believed that
the same voters whose opinions have such a small probability of being
true can be enlightened enough-certainly not to pronounce with
some probability of truth as to which man among a great number has
the most merit-but to choose, as the most enlightened, one of those
whose opinions will have a large enough probability of being true.
Thus a numerous assembly composed of voters who are not very
enlightened could be usefully employed only to choose the members of
a less numerous assembly to which the decision on other matters
would then be entrusted.
143
From these observations about representative democracy, Condorcet
concluded that "the form most appropriate to fulfill all the conditions
required is at the same time the simplest one: that in which a single assembly,
composed of enlightened men, alone pronounces a judgment by a majority
large enough to give adequate assurance of the truth of the judgment, even
when the majority is the minimum required." 144 Here, Condorcet adds a
third, and final element to his theory of decision making-method or
mechanism; in this case, the method is majority vote.
The simple majority vote mechanism worked well, according to
Condorcet, when there could be "only two opinions in a decision, i.e. that
one was deliberating on the truth of a simple proposition or its opposite."'
145
Unfortunately, many decisions cannot be reduced to two contradictory
opinions. In such complicated cases, Condorcet was again concerned with
having "a sufficient probability of obtaining a true decision, and of the
decision obtained being true."14
A. The Inauthentic Results Case
At this point, Condorcet began to look at different possible distributions
of individual voter preferences among three candidates for election: A, B and
C. This analysis revealed two troublesome cases in his theory of elections.
143. Id. at 61 (emphasis added). In this aspect, Condorcet differs significantly from Rousseau,
who was firmly opposed to representative democracy.
144. Id. at 50. Condorcet later increased his faith in greater political participation by the voting
public at large. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Condorcet's
support of a unicameral legislature, see infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
145. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 50.
146. Id. at 52.
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First, he identified a three-way contest with a simple majority vote resulting
in a "decision really contrary to the opinion of the majority. 147 Although
Condorcet never gave this particular problem a precise name, this Article
refers to the first problem case as the inauthentic results case-a case where
simple majority voting among three candidates generates a definitive result,
but one that does not reflect the majority view. 48 Condorcet's inauthentic
results example involved a group of sixty voters whose individual votes for
the candidates were as follows:
Candidate A: 23 votes
Candidate B: 19 votes
Candidate C: 18 votes
Total votes: 60 votes
Given a simple majority vote between the three candidates, A is declared the
winner. According to Condorcet, this approach faulters because it only
provides information about the votersfirst choices and gives no indication as
to how the voters ranked the remaining two candidates.
To make his point, Condorcet supposes that the particular distribution of
preferences among the voters would rank the candidates as follows:
Rank Order of Preferences for Candidates
149
VOTERS First Choice Second Choice Third Choice
All 23 voters forA: A C B
All 19 voters forB: B C A
16 of the 18 voters for C: C B A
2 of the 18 voters for C: C A B
In such a case, Condorcet concluded that C is the clear winner, so that "the
candidate really enjoying the vote of the majority would be precisely the one
who would have had the least votes according to the ordinary method of
election."'150 He makes this point more clearly by supposing that instead of a
simple majority vote among the three candidates, the voting mechanism had
taken three pairwise votes: A v. B, B v. C and A v. C. Candidate C would be
the winner in this example regardless of the order in which the three pairwise
147. Id. at 53.
148. Black refers to this as the case of three candidates "when the voting yields a set of consistent
propositions." BLACK, supra note 31, at 168.
149. Condorcet did not use precisely the format used in the text. The tabulation in the text above
was extrapolated to make the hypothetical more accessible.
150. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 53.
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contests are put to a vote. 51
By way of this example, Condorcet showed that the simple majority
voting method usually employed in three-way elections would result in a
choice of the wrong candidate. This particular problem is soluble, however.
By using a method which presents all possible combinations of pairwise
votes, a proper winner emerges. Specifically, Condorcet concluded:
1. that to have a majority decision that merits confidence, it is
absolutely necessary to reduce all opinions in such a way that they
represent in a distinct manner the different combinations that can arise
from a system of simple propositions and their opposites;
2. that then counting separately all the votes given in favor of each of
these propositions or its opposite, it is necessary to take that
proposition from each pair which has the majority, and to form from
all these propositions the opinion that must prevail.1
52
This pairwise comparison approach has come to be known as the Condorcet
winner or Condorcet criterion-requiring a group choice of the alternative
that beats all others in pairwise elections using majority rule. 53 Most
theorists agree that the Condorcet winner should be the group choice where
such a winner exists.' 5
4
B. The Inconsistent or Arbitrary Results Case
A more serious problem arises in a three-way election in which no
alternative beats all others in pairwise contests. This is the second, and more
difficult case-the inconsistent or arbitrary results case, more commonly
known as the familiar vote cycling case. 5 5 For this example, Condorcet
returns to the three-way election between candidates A, B and C in which a
simple majority vote resulted in twenty-three votes for A, nineteen votes for
B and eighteen votes for C. Instead of the particular distribution of
preferences described in the inauthentic results example, Condorcet now
151. In the A v. B contest, B would win by a vote of 35 to 25. In the B v. C. contest, C would win
by a vote of41 to 19. In the A v. C contest, C would win by a vote of37 to 23.
152. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 51.
153. See MUELLER. supra note 5, at 112. Using terminology from game theoretic approaches, this
case would be referred to as a game with a "core" solution. This Article will use the Condorcet winner
or Condorcet criterion terminology drawn from the social choice literature.
154. See, e.g., id. at 114; Levmore, Bicameralism, supra note 16, at 156-57.
155. Condorcet's discussion of the "contradictory" case appears in Condorcet, Essay, supra note
21, at 55. Black refers to this as the case of three candidates which "yields a set of inconsistent
propositions." BLACK, supra note 31, at 171-73. For a description of the voting cycle case, see supra
text accompanying notes 38-47.
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imagines that the ranked distribution of preferences is as follows:
Rank Order of Preferences for Candidates
56
VOTERS First Choice Second Choice Third Choice
All 23 voters forA: A B C
17 of the 19 voters forB: B C A
2 of the 19 voters forB: B A C
10 of the 18 voters for C: C A B
8 of the 18 voters for C: C B A
Given this particular preference distribution, no one candidate would beat all
others in pairwise comparisons; there is no Condorcet winner. 5 7 A would
win in the A v. B contest by thirty-three to twenty-seven, B would win in the
B v. C contest by forty-two to eighteen, and C would win in the C v. A
contest by thirty-five to twenty-five. The resulting collective distribution of
preferences is that A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, but C is preferred
to A. Condorcet described this type of distribution as "contradictory.' 18 The
modem term of logic used to describe this particular preference distribution
is intransitive. Under general principles of transitivity, if A is preferred to B
and B is preferred to C, then A should be preferred to C. An intransitive
distribution of preferences is thought to be irrational or illogical.
5 9
More than simply illogical, the outcome in this example is inconsistent
and arbitrary; the outcome differs depending upon the order in which
candidates are put to a series of pairwise votes. Imagine, for example, that the
first vote pits A against B. A wins by a vote of thirty-three to twenty-seven
and B is eliminated. In the runoff between A and C, C wins by a vote of
thirty-five to twenty-five. C is declared the winner. If instead, the first vote
pitted B against C, B would win by a vote of forty-two to eighteen and C (the
winner under the first agenda) is eliminated. In the runoff between A and B, A
wins by a vote of thirty-three to twenty-seven. This is the classic vote cycling
dilemma. 1
60
Condorcet responds to the dilemma by noting, "If there is no necessity to
elect, the decision will be regarded as null and void." 161 In other words, in
156. Again, the tabulated preferences are extrapolated from Condorcet's Essay. See supra note
149.
157. In game theory terminology, this would be referred to as the solution with no core or an
empty core. See, e.g., ANATOL RAPOPORT, N-PERSON GAME THEORY: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS
89(1970).
158. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 51.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 73-75
160. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
161. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 55.
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such inconsistent results cases, "both majority rule and the Condorcet
criterion may declare no candidate a winner." When it is essential to declare
a winner, Condorcet suggests that "it is necessary to take successively all the
propositions that have a majority, beginning with those possessing the
largest.' ' 162 As paraphrased by Black, Condorcet's proposed solution is that
"of the three propositions with majorities in their favour, delete the one with
the lowest majority and take the straightforward interpretation of the other
two." 163 Condorcet returned to the voting paradox and related issues after the
Revolution when France was establishing its Constitution. Referring again to
the inconsistent results problem, he noted, "In an election between three
candidates, the three judgments which obtain majority support when the
candidates are compared two by two may sometimes be inconsistent, even
when the individual judgements of each voter involve no contradiction."' 64
Repeating the same solution presented in his 1785 Essay, Condorcet said,
"We must therefore reject the proposition with the smallest majority and
retain the other two.
'165
Condorcet surely understood that there was no definitive solution to the
vote cycling case. Conceding that he had only presented "an imperfect
sketch," Condorcet noted the following requirements for decision making,
which bear quoting in full:
1. In the case of decisions on complicated questions, it is necessary for
the system of simple propositions involved in such questions to be
rigorously worked out, for each possible opinion to be clearly stated,
for each voter to express his judgment on each of the propositions
forming this opinion and not simply on the general result. The manner
162. Id. at 56.
163. BLACK, supra note 31, at 113 (paraphrasing from Condorcet's essay). Black criticizes this
approach, agreeing with the later observations of Arrow that there is no correct solution to the
inconsistent results case. An alternative mechanism that some find attractive is the "Borda Count,"
developed by one of Condorcet's colleagues at the Acadmie Fran~aise. Under this method, each voter
lists his or her individual preferences in rank order. The lowest preferred outcome on each list gets a
score of zero; the next-to-last preferred outcome gets a score of one; the preference above that gets a
score of two, and so on. The preference with the overall highest score is declared the winner. For a
description of the Borda Count and its desirable and undesirable qualities, see MUELLER, supra note 5,
at 113, 117-20; Young, supra note 119, at 1236-43.
164. Condorcet, On Elections (1793), translated in MCLEAN & HEWITT, supra note 21, at 235,
236 [hereinafter Condorcet, On Elections].
165. Id. It has been suggested that Condorcet himself here is violating the independence of
irrelevant alternatives condition, since the preference with respect to one pairwise comparison is used
to infer preferences with respect to a different pairwise comparison. See, e.g., Dennis R. McGrath,
James Madison and Social Choice Theory: The Possibility of Republicanism, 102 (1983) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park) (on file with McKeldin Library, University
of Maryland, College Park).
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in which the question is put to the vote is therefore very important;
and the business of establishing this form is one of the most delicate
and difficult responsibilities that the body charged to decide, or those
who have established it, can confer. Yet among the ancients, and even
among the moderns, it has been almost everywhere left to chance, or
given as a power or right attached to a particular office, rather than
imposed as a duty that demands wisdom and precision.
2. It is necessary, furthermore, that voters be enlightened; and that
they be the more enlightened, the more complicated the question upon
which they decide. Otherwise, while one will indeed find a form of
decision-making to prevent a false decision, this will at the same time
render any decision almost impossible. It will therefore be a means
only of perpetuating abuses and bad laws.
166
This long quote makes it clear that Condorcet understood the implications
of his paradox. He knew that in certain vote cycling cases, no clear and
consistent result would emerge, and he recognized that the problem might
well be insoluble. Long before the social choice theorists, Condorcet
recognized the power of the agenda setter and stressed the importance of
allocating such power with "wisdom and precision."
In the same year that Condorcet wrote the essay containing his theory of
elections, he also supported a controversial essay contest proposed to the
Academy of Science in 1785, addressing the application of mathematical
reasoning to political decision making. Apparently, some in the Academy
thought that the essay contest would be wasteful of resources since many of
the political decision-making problems could not be solved scientifically.167
In a letter to the Journal de Paris supporting the essay contest, Condorcet at
first rejected the notion that the problem had no solution. In any event,
Condorcet tellingly observed that "to prove that a question is insoluble is, in
a sense, to solve it; and in the case of questions as important as this, one has
done something useful if one is able to caution other men against concerning
themselves with it."168 Here again, Condorcet recognizes the paradox but
chooses not to obsess about it. Condorcet was content to accept a less than
perfect or "good approximate method"' 69 as long as it presented a "fairly
large probability"' 7 of reaching a correct result. Condorcet probably would
166. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 56-57 (emphasis added).
167. The contest is described in BAKER, supra note 32, at 226.
168. Letter from Condorcet to the Journal de Paris (Oct. 9, 1785), in BAKER, supra note 32, at
227.
169. Condorcet, On Elections, supra note 164, at 239.
170. Id. at 236.
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agree with Professors Farber and Frickey's suggestion: "Since we can never
fashion a procedure that will fit [Arrow's] postulates, there may be little point
in judging the decision-making process by this standard: they all flunk. Our
standards might do better to look within the legislative black box to inquire
into the inherent quality of political procedures."' 7' As described in the
sections that follow, much of Condorcet's later work examined the quality of
procedures as well as the quality of inputs to the "legislative black box."
V. CMC REPUBLICAN THEMES IN CONDORCET'S WORK
Condorcet's draft constitutional plan, presented to the National
Convention on February 15 and 16, 1793,172 contrasts sharply with his
original support of the enlightened monarch who might rule with greater
reason than the masses might rule themselves. In his remarkable essay La
Nation Fran9aise a Tous Les Peuples [From the French to People
Everywhere], 173 also written in February 1793, Condorcet urged the world to
learn from France's calamities at the hands of tyrants. Even if the current
form of government by king or hereditary magistrates seems sufficient to
protect liberties, Condorcet asked, "are you sure that you will not discover
tomorrow in [the constitutional monarchy] vices that may be destructive of
your liberty? Are you sure that those in power will not someday find a way to
oppress you?" 74 Condorcet's sensitivity to issues of personal liberty suggest
that he is more accurately classified as a liberal republican than as a
proponent of social choice theory.
175
171. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 60.
172. Although the plan came from the constitutional drafting committee, it is generally recognized
as Condoreet's work. The draft constitution is included in the twelve-volume collection of Condorcet's
work. See 12 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 423. Portions of Condorcet's speech to the
National Convention describing the plan have been translated into English. See Condorcet, On the
Principles of the Constitutional Plan Presented to the National Convention, translated in CONDORCET:
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 143 [hereinafter Condorcet, Constitutional Plan]. The actual
proposal to the Convention includes two parts. The first part is a detailed declaration of the rights of
man. See Condorcet, Projet de Declaration Des Droits Naturels, Civils et Politiques Des Homines [On
the Declaration of the Natural, Civil and Political Rights of Man], in 12 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET,
supra note 1, at 417, partially translated in MCLEAN & HEWIrr, supra note 21, at 280. The second
part is the proposed constitution itself, Projet de Constitution Frangaise [French Constitution], in 12
OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 423 [hereinafter Condorcet, French Constitution]. The
proposed constitution itself is not available in English translation.
173. 12 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 505.
174. Id. at 507 ("etes-vous sir fque demain vous ne d~couvrirez pas, dans cette constitution, des
vices destructeurs de votre libertV? Etes-vous stirs que les d~positaires de vos pouvoirs n'y trouveront
pas un jour des moyens de vous opprimer?").
175. For a discussion of the possibility of liberal republicanism, see supra notes 112-14 and
accompanying text.
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Despite the potential voting paradox, Condorcet was not only comfortable
but also passionate about leaving decisions to the people through their
elected representatives. Moreover, he clearly had not forgotten about his
earlier discovery. In an essay written in June 1793, entitled Sur les Elections
[On Elections],176 Condorcet returned to the vote cycling problem, restating
the problem and the imperfect solution without significant change in position
from his 1785 Essay. Indeed, the proposed 1793 constitution depended
heavily on direct public voting participation through regional legislative
assemblies, known as the assemblges primaires, where the French were "to
exercise their rights as citizens."'177 These assemblies were to be quite large,
composing no less than 450 and no more than 900 citizens. 178 The assemblies
would then elect boards of at least fifty citizens. These boards were
responsible for maintaining the registry of voters and convoking the full
assembly in situations required by the proposed constitution. 179 The regional
assemblies would meet annually to elect a National Legislature, composed of
a single chamber.1
80
Condorcet's 1793 constitutional proposal bears all the hallmarks of liberal
republican thought. Each of the four central republican principles is
represented in that proposed constitution and in many of Condorcet's other
works. 181 Each of these principles is considered in turn in the sections that
follow.
A. Deliberation
182
Deliberation surely lies at the heart of the civic republican view that
individuals can be persuaded to look beyond self-interest toward a common
good. In sharp contrast to the notion that individual preferences are purely
endogenous and immutable, the idea that preferences can be changed or
transformed exogenously through exposure to other viewpoints is critical to
the civic republican vision. The 1793 constitution, authored primarily by
Condorcet and proposed to the first French Republic's National Convention,
176. 12 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 637.
177. See Condorcet, French Constitution, supra note 172, at 427 (Titre III, Sec. I, Art. I).
178. Seeid.
179. See id. at 430 (Titre I1, Sec. II, Art. II).
180. See id. at 460 (Titre VII, Sec. I, Art.I, I).
181. These four principles as identified earlier are: 1) deliberation; 2) equality; 3) universalism;
and 4) citizenship. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
182. For civic republicans, deliberation requires more than simply working out a deal with each
participant focused on his or her self-interest. Instead, deliberation requires participants to "achieve a
measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting these desires and
practices to scrutiny and review." Sunnstein, Republican Revival, supra note 29, at 1548-49.
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included numerous features designed to stimulate and enhance this exposure
through deliberative political dialogue.
The design of Condorcet's proposed regional assemblies was to
encourage debate, dialogue and deliberation. Voters were not to enter an
isolated voting booth and simply register their preferences. Condorcet's
proposed constitution required the president of the assembly to present the
question, "reduced to a question answerable by a simple yes or no vote" and
subject to a mandatory delay of one week imposed for deliberation before a
vote could be taken. 183 The assembly chamber was to be open every Sunday
of the year, with at least one member of the elected Board present to allow
citizens to join together to educate themselves to discuss and deliberate
proposals. 184 No law or decree was to be promulgated without two
deliberations and two votes. The first vote would determine whether to take
up the matter. If the vote on the first question was positive, a second
deliberation and vote was taken to adopt or reject a proposal. Finally, the
proposed constitution imposed a mandatory delay of a fortnight between the
first and second vote1 85 which could be abridged only by majority vote. 186
Perhaps the best evidence of Condorcet's commitment to improving the
quality of deliberation is his focus on education.187 As Condorcet noted in his
biography of Turgot, "It is easy to establish assemblies; but their utility
depends entirely upon the education of their members and the intelligence
that inspires them .... 148 Through a system of public education that would
foster and improve the most talented members of society, Condorcet hoped
to create enlightened leaders of opinion. Together, the people and their
representatives would create the most enlightened laws-those with the
183. See Condorcet, French Constitution, supra note 172, at 438 (Titre III, Sec. V, Art. I: "Ile
prdsident fera connaitre l'objet de ]a ddlibdration, rdduit At une question simple A laquelle on puisse
rdpondre par oui ou par non").
184. See id. (Titre I, Sec. V, Art. III: "La salle sera aussi ouverte tous les dimanches de l'annde
aux citoyens qui voudront s'y rdunir, et le bureau commettra l'un de ses membres").
185. See id. at 466 (Titre VII, Sec. III, Art. IX).
186. See id. at 467 (Art. XIII). Condorcet's proposed Constitution was also remarkably specific
regarding procedures for the passage of legislation within the National Legislature. All deliberations
were to be public, and a record of the proceedings was to be printed. See id. at 465 (Titre VII, Sec. III,
Art. 1). Laws and decrees were to be determined by absolute majority vote. See id. (Art. II).
187. Condorcet was careful to distinguish between "education" and "instruction." The former
included "the teaching of truths of fact and calculation. It embraces all political, moral, or religious
opinions." Condorcet, The Nature and Purpose of Instruction (1791), translated in CONDORCET:
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 105, 125 [Condorcet, Instruction]. His argument for limiting
public education to instruction was based on his fear of tyranny and loss of liberty: "The individual
who enters society with opinions inculcated by his education is no longer a free man; he is a slave of
his teachers." Id.
188. 5 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 122, translated in BAKER, supra note 32, at
292.
[VOL. 76:975
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/3
TRUTH AND PROBABILITY
highest probability of being "true" or "good."
Condorcet designed many of the proposed provisions, such as the
mandatory delays for deliberation and keeping assembly chambers open on
Sundays for discussion, to improve the quality of input, and thus, increase the
probability of a good result. Moreover, Condorcet hoped that such thoughtful
deliberation would frequently reduce the issue to simple questions with only
two choices, thus avoiding the vote cycling paradox. Condorcet here sounds
much more like the civic republican than the social choice theorist.
B. Political Equality
In Part Five of his Declaration of Rights dealing with Equality, Condorcet
opened, "Men have joined together in society in order to preserve their
natural rights, and these rights are the same for all. Society must therefore
ensure that everyone has an equal enjoyment of all these rights."'8 9
Condorcet's views surely reflect a commitment to political equality, defined
as "a desire to eliminate sharp disparities in political participation or
influence among individuals or social groups."'' 9° He advocated universal
suffrage, including voting rights for women, a proposal virtually unthinkable
in his day. He chastised men for "violating the principle of equal rights by
debarring women from citizenship rights, and thereby calmly depriving half
of the human race of the right to participate in the formation of laws."' 91
Furthermore, as a founder of the Society of Friends of Negroes, almost a
century before the United States Civil War, Condorcet declared: "an entire
race; part of the world, crushed beneath the weight of its chains, cries out to
us for the restoration of its sacred human rights" 9 2 and that "slavery could
not be reconciled with the principles of equality, gentleness, and
humanity."'
193
Although he initially believed in limiting the vote to property holders,
189. Condorcet, Declaration ofRights (1789), translated in MCLEAN & HEWITT, supra note 21, at
255, 267 [hereinafter Condorcet, Declaration of Rights].
190. Sunnstein, Republican Revival, supra note 29, at 1541. Condoreet was an ardent advocate of
liberty, equality, women's rights, universal public education and the abolition of slavery. Perhaps the
best discussion of his contributions to liberalism appears in SCHAPIRO, supra note 87. In fact, Schapiro
argues that "Condorcet succeeded in creating a complete pattern of liberalism. A criticism of
Condorcet's ideas and methods, therefore, constitutes a criticism of modem liberalism." Id. at 273.
Ironically, the social choice theory he is thought to have fathered has been described as a "threat to
liberalism." See Luban, supra note 5 1, at 523.
191. Condorcet, On Giving Women the Right of Citizenship (1790), translated in MCLEAN &
HEWITT, supra note 21, at 335.
192. Condorcet, Rules for the Society of the Friends ofNegroes (1788), translated in MCLEAN &
HEWITT, supra note 21, at 34 1.
193. Id. at 343.
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Condorcet later realized that denial of access to the political process was
inconsistent with democratic principles. He later argued that rights to
political participation should not depend upon the extent of a citizen's
property or wealth. His 1789 Declaration of Rights provided, "The
legislature may not make a man's entitlement to fulfill certain functions
dependent on the size of that man's land or on other aspects of his fortune.
This would give the rich an advantage which does not necessarily result from
their wealth."'
94
Condorcet was also concerned with economic disparities that made it
more difficult for some to participate in the process. For example, he
suggested subsidy payments to poor families that lost the agricultural
assistance of children attending his proposed free, public schools.,95 A
commitment to such subsidies and to redistribution generally is inimical to
the public choice perspective.
C. Universalism
Condorcet's lifetime work surely appears consistent with a republican
commitment to universalism, defined as "a belief in the possibility of
mediating different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of the
public good, through discussion and dialogue ... to produce substantively
correct outcomes."'96 As is clearly shown by his emphasis on the probability
of achieving correct outcomes, t97 Condorcet did not view the political
process as simply an aggregation of personal preferences. As an
Enlightenment philosophe, Condorcet believed in the possibility of group
decisions made in accordance with "practical reason." Despite the insoluble
voting paradox, Condorcet's constitutional proposals included remarkably
detailed requirements designed to assure the highest possible probability of
substantively correct results, both in choosing the best representatives and in
selecting the best legislative policies. For example, Title Im of Condorcet's
proposed constitution contains remarkably detailed requirements regarding
the method of elections. 98 There were to be at least two ballots-one simply
194. Id. at 267 (translation of "Declaration of Rights" (1789)). This was a change from
Condorcet's earlier position, which would have denied voting rights to those without property.
195. For a more detailed discussion of Condorcet's education policy, see infra notes 200-09 and
accompanying text.
196. Sunnstein, Republican Revival, supra note 29, at 1554 (emphasis added).
197. See discussion atsupra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
198. The proposed constitution even goes so far as to require that the census of voters be verified
at 4:00 p.m. on the second day of the assembly by reading the name of each voter in a loud voice. See
Condorcet, French Constitution, supra note 172, at 431 (Titre III, Sec. III, Art. IV). In a rather
defensive sounding footnote to the proposed constitutional plan, Condorcet conceded, "II est peut-etre
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to create a list of candidates and a second to elect candidates to the National
Legislature. At the second ballot, voters in the assemblies were to complete a
ballot in two columns. The necessary number of candidates from each
assembly was elected from a tally of the first column votes from those
receiving an absolute majority. If there was no absolute majority, the votes of
both columns were then tallied, and the number of necessary candidates was
elected in order of the plurality vote.199
Most important, to enhance the possibility of mediating different
approaches, Condorcet's vision focused heavily on universal education. As
an elected member of the National Assembly in 1792, Condorcet chaired the
Committee on Public Instruction. In this capacity Condorcet prepared a
monumental Report and Project for a Decree on the General Organization
of Public Instruction, which was presented to the Assembly in 1792.20 In
this report and his earlier 1791 essays on education, Condorcet made clear
his view of education as a right, without which all other rights remain
unknown.2 t His extraordinary 1792 report to the Legislative Assembly
dans ce projet quelques articles qui, au premier aperqu, paraitront r~glementaires; mais ces articles
tiennent si essentiellment au plan gtn~ral, que la rfflexion et la discussion pourront les faire regarder
comme vraiment constitutionnels." Id. at 423 n.1 ("Certain articles in this project may, at first blush,
appear regulatory; but these articles are so essential to the general plan, that reflection and discussion
will make clear that they are truly constitutional.").
199. See id. at 434-35 (Titre II, Sec. II, Art. XII-XX).
200. Unfortunately, as a consequence of the declaration of war against Austria in 1792, this
Legislative Assembly was dissolved and no action was taken on Condorcet's education proposal. See
R~nee Waldinger, Condorcet: The Problematic Nature of Progress, reprinted in CONDORCET
STUDIES, supra note 89, at 125.
201. In the opening sentence of his first essay on public education, Condorcet emphatically
proclaimed that "public instruction is an obligation owed by society to all citizens." Condorcet, Sur
l'instruction publique [On Public Instruction], in 7 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 169
[hereinafter Condorcet, On Public Instruction] ("L'instruction publique est un devoir de la societ6 A
l'6gard des citoyens."). Condorcet is careful here to use the term "instruction" rather than "education."
See supra note 187.
The American Founders also recognized the tremendous importance of education to democracy.
Jefferson, in particular, was aware that universal public education was essential "if the virtue that
makes men choose public over private interest is to be sustained .... Martin D. Carcieri, Democracy
and Education in the Thought of Jefferson and Madison, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 7 (1997). Jefferson's
views on the importance of education to democracy are reflected in Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the
More General Diffision of Knowledge, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 365 (Merrill D. Peterson
ed., 1984). Although they recognized the importance of education, the Founders did not include a right
to education in the United States Constitution.
Many countries throughout the world have recognized a right to equal education and some have
argued that the United States should recognize this right as a part of customary international law. See
Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle or Customary
International Legal Right?, 11 HARV. BLACKLEW1ER J. 37 (1994). Virtually all states within the
United States have included a right to education as part of their state constitutions. Although dicta
from the United States Supreme Court suggests the possibility of a federal constitutional right to some
"identifiable quantum" of education, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36
1998] 1017
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called for free, universal public education for both men and women,202 with
stipends to assist families facing difficulty upon loss of their childrens'
agricultural services. To Condorcet, "the aim of education can no longer be
to consecrate established opinions but, on the contrary, to subject them to
free examination by succeeding generations that will be progressively more
enlightened."2 3 Academic freedom was essential to teaching students how to
think and to avoid the teaching of dogmatic truths.
Condorcet's views on education should be considered in their
revolutionary context. France was converting from monarchy to republic and
its people had to prepare for a change in status from subject to citizen.
Although he passionately believed in equal rights for all citizens, Condorcet
understood that intelligence and abilities differ among individuals. 204 Thus,
he envisioned a "hierarchical educational system appropriate to different
talents and abilities" 205 that would foster, develop and encourage those with
superior talent. At the same time, Condorcet believed that all citizens should
receive a sufficient education to prepare for everyday life and to permit them
to understand and freely to exercise their rights as individuals. He believed
that providing more education to those with greater ability ultimately would
inure to the benefit of all.206 To achieve this end, he viewed the primary goal
(1973), the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a general right to education as a fundamental right
implied by the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. See id. at 35. Many
commentators have been quite critical of the Rodriguez decision. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 140 (1993); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HAST. L.J. 1 (1987); David A. J. Richards, Equal Opportunity
and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 32
(1973). For a comprehensive argument that the United States Constitution includes an implied right to
education, see Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End ofthe National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550 (1992).
202. Condorcet was again ahead of his time as an ardent advocate for women's rights, including
education, full citizenship and voting. In 1790, he published an essay on women's citizenship rights.
See Condorcet, Sur l'admission desfemmes au droit de cit6 [On the Admission of Women to the Rights
of Citizenship], translated in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 97. In a series of
articles on public education he wrote in 1791, Condorcet was adamant that instruction should be the
same for women as for men. See, e.g., Condorcet, Instruction, supra note 187, at 134-40.
203. Condorcet, Instruction, supra note 187, at 126.
204. Condorcet conceded that "even an equal education cannot help but to increase the superiority
of those whom nature has favored with higher intellect." Condorcet, On Public Instruction, supra note
201, at 170 ("II est impossible qu'une instruction meme dgale n'augmente pas las supdriorit6 de ceux
que la nature a favoris6s d'une organisation plus heureuse.").
205. BAKER, supra note 32, at 294. Condorcet's views on education were quite similar to
Jefferson's on this point. Both believed in providing additional education to the best students so as to
prepare them for public service. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTiTUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 315 (1994).
206. "Even though the superiority of some seems an evil to those who do not have the same
advantages, it will contribute to the common good, and the talents of the enlightened will become
society's common inheritance." Condorcet, On Public Instruction, supra note 201, at 170 ("[B]ien loin
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of public education as "enabl[ing] the majority of citizens to recognize when
it was necessary to entrust their interests to more enlightened men."20 7 In
addition, the "function of more advanced education was to produce the
enlightened individuals to whom these interests could safely be entrusted. 2 8
Finally, he supported regular continuing education for those no longer in
school.
2 9
At least one commentator has noted the strong connection between the
educational philosophy of John Dewey and Condorcet: "Dewey brings late
nineteenth century educational thinking into line with Condorcet's late
eighteenth century hope for progress of the human mind-socially,
individually, and morally."210 The similarities between John Dewey and
Condorcet extend far beyond their views on education. Indeed, it is quite
surprising that the alleged father of social choice theory would have so much
in common with Dewey, whose views are closer to those of civic republicans
and who was often described as a political and social activist.21 Even though
Dewey lived almost a century after Condorcet, his writing expresses much of
the optimistic spirit of Condorcet's Enlightenment. In words that Condorcet
himself might have chosen, Dewey argued:
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human
nature; faith in human intelligence and in the power of pooled and
que la sup~riorit6 de quelques hommes soit un mal pour ceux qui n'ont pas requ les m~mes avantages,
elle contribuera au bien de tous, et les talents comme les lumiares deviendront le patrimoine commun
de la socit6.").
207. BAKER. supra note 32, at 297. This particular elitist tone to Condorcet's thoughts on
education are a bit troubling. The broad participation envisioned in his later 1793 proposed
constitution itself suggests that Condorcet's views on the competence of the general electorate had
broadened.
208. Id. Condorcet observed, "it is difficult to hope for a nation that can enjoy peaceful liberty and
the perfection of its institutions and laws, if it does not seek to multiply that class of men whose
impartiality, disinterestedness, and enlightenment must end up directing opinion." Condorcet, On
Public Instruction, supra note 201, at 193 ("il est difficile d'espdrer qu'une nation puisse jouir d'une
libert6 paisible, et perfectionner ses institutions et ses lois, si l'on ne voit s'y multiplier cette classe
d'hommes, dont l'impartialit6, le d6sintressement et les lumi~res doivent finir par diriger l'opinion").
209. In fact, the anticlerical Condorcet saw this continuing education as an alternative to Sunday
religious observance. Under Cordorcet's plan,
Sunday was to be the day of adult education for those whose schooling did not go beyond the
primary grade.... Sunday, being given over to education, he argued, would be truly a day of
rest... In these Sunday schools for adults, lectures and reading courses were to be given. There
was to be civic instruction, based upon the Declaration of the Rights ofMan.
SCHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 209.
210. J.J. Chambliss, Comments in ENLIGHTENMENT AND SOCIAL PROGRESS: EDUCATION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 174 (J.J. Chambliss ed., 1971) (preceding reprint of essay by John Dewey,
entitled Education as the Remaking of Experience).
211. See ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY at x, xvi (1991).
Later in his life, Dewey might even be described as a socialist. See id. at 429.
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cotperative experience. It is not belief that these things are complete
but that if given a show they will grow and be able to generate
progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective
action.212
Like Condorcet and the modem civic republicans, Dewey believed deeply
in the power of deliberation and its possibilities for growth and
transformation of "preferences." For Dewey, "democracy encompasses far
more than 'process."' Instead, he claimed that democracy is "organized
intelligence." 213 Writing about language and communication, Dewey
observed, 'The heart of language is ... the establishment of cooperation in
an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is
modified and regulated by partnership." 214 Like Condorcet and the civic
republicans, Dewey's faith in the power of deliberation or "pooled
intelligence" has been criticized as naive.215
Condorcet's highly scientific approach to the social sciences 216 can also
be found in Dewey, who believed that "the key to solving social problems
lies in the application of the methods of natural science to those problems."
217
Both believed that some political outcomes were more "true" or "correct"
than others. Although it was quite central to Condorcet's thinking, he never
really defined what he meant by the notion of "truth." Dewey, on the other
hand, spent much of his life's work focusing on the meaning of truth or true
outcomes. As applied to Condorcet's probabalistic approach to collective
decision making, Dewey's notion of truth provides additional support for the
civic republican viewpoint.
218
D. Citizenship
Condorcet's 1793 proposed constitution depended heavily on public
participation of citizens.219 Most significantly, Condorcet advocated
extremely broad guaranteed rights of participation. In his 1789 Declaration
of Rights, Condorcet claimed that "[a]ll citizens without distinction have an
212. W.T. JONES, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TO
WITTGENSTEIN AND SARTRE 42 (2d ed. rev. 1975) (citing JOHN DEWEY, SCHOOL AND SOCIETY
(1937)).
213. Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro, Introduction to JOHN DEWEY, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS at xiii
(Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds., Hacket Publ'g Co. 1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL WRITINGS].
214. JONES, supra note 212, at 50 (citing JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (1925)).
215. Id. at 63; see also supra note 131.
216. See supra notes 89-92, 126-28 and accompanying text.
217. JONES, supra note 212, at 40.
218. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 172-80, 189-94 and accompanying text.
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equal share of citizenship rights.... There must be no inequality other than
that which necessarily results from the need to divide them into many
sections and subsections. 220
Condorcet's commitment to democratic decision making by majority vote
of the citizens was so firm that he rejected many of the checks and balances
included in the United States Constitution.221 For example, Condorcet's
proposed unicameral National Legislature was given the sole legislative
power, with the exception of constitutional laws, which were to be adopted
through the assemblies.222 Any law or decree promulgated by the proposed
National Legislature in accordance with the formalities provided in proposed223
Title VII was to have the force of law. The proposed executive branch had
very limited authority as compared to the strong executive under the United
States Constitution.224 Unlike the United States Constitution, there was no
provision for signature or veto by an executive branch. On the other hand,
Condorcet's proposed constitution provided significant "censure" rights to
the people through their regional assemblies. Title VIII provided a detailed
procedure whereby citizens could petition for reconsideration of legislative
or administrative decisions or for the reform of existing laws.225
Condorcet's passionate advocacy for a unicameral legislature is also quite
inconsistent with social choice thinking. Modem social choice theory
suggests that an unicameral legislature is more likely to experience cycled
preference distribution and, therefore, to present a more troublesome case
than the bicameral legislature. In one study comparing the bicameral United
220. Condorcet, Declaration of Rights, supra note 189, at 267-68.
221. For a comparison of Condorcet's proposals to United States constitutional provisions, see
Victor G. Rosenblum, Condorcet as Constitutional Draftsman: Dimensions of Substantive
Commitment and Procedural Implementation, reprinted in CONDORCET STUDIES, supra note 89, at
18 8-206 (comparing proposed constitution, Title 3, Articles 1,4,5).
222. See Condorcet, French Constitution, supra note 172, at 463 (Titre VII, See. II, Art. I, II).
223. See id. at 468 (Titre VII, Sec.III, Art. XVI).
224. The proposed constitution called for an Executive Council made up of seven ministers to be
elected by the citizens in their primary assemblies. See id. at 446, 452 (Titre V, Sec. I, Art. I; Sec. II,
Art. 1). The presiding minister was to rotate every 15 days. See id. at 447 (Titre V, Sec. I, Art. III). The
Council was charged with directing military and foreign affairs, id. at 448 (Titre V, See. I, Art. XIII),
and establishing a national treasury. Id. at 449 (Titre V, Sec. I, Art. XVIII.) Most important, the
Executive Council's role generally was limited to executing the law. See id. at 447 (Titre V, Sec. I,
Art. IV). The Council was permitted to propose that the legislature consider certain matters, but was
not otherwise authorized to offer advice on legislative matters unless formally invited to do so by the
legislature. See id. at 456 (Titre V, Sec. III, Art. II).
225. See id. at 469-76 (Titre VIII, entitled, De la Censure du Peuple Sur Les Actes de la
Reprisentation Nationale, et du Droit de Pdtition [On Censure by the People ofActs of the National
Legislature and the Right ofPetition]). The proposed Constitution also provided rights to the people,
through their regional assemblies, to bring grievance actions against public officials for abuses of
power or violations of law. See id. at 475 (Titre VIII, Art. XXXIII).
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States legislature with the unicameral Parliament in Great Britain, political
scientist and social choice adherent William Riker argues that unicameral
legislatures are more subject to cycling.226 Based on the implications of
social choice theory, those in control of the agenda have tremendous power
to manipulate outcomes because cycled preference distributions can lead to
the inconsistent results case.227 By requiring that legislative decisions be
made by two chambers, rather than one, the bicameral legislature places
obstacles in the path of such a manipulative agenda setter. Professor Saul
Levmore notes this connection between bicameralism and the voting
paradox, concluding, "Bicameralism can be understood as an antidote to the
manipulative power of the convener, or agenda setter, when faced with
cycling preferences. ' 28
In light of these observations, Condorcet's opposition to the bicameral
form of legislature adds to the "Condorcet Irony." He was a particularly
strong admirer of the unicameral form of the first Pennsylvania State
Constitution, drafted in 1776 under the leadership of Benjamin Franklin,229
and used it as a model for his proposed draft of the first Constitution for the
French Republic. He passionately advocated a unicameral, rather than a
bicameral, legislature because he believed that the bicameral legislature
would result in anti-majoritarian outcomes.230 In his speech to the 1793
National Convention in support of his proposed constitution, Condorcet
argued:
[I]t is clear that if, for example, two separate assemblies were required
to act in concert, the will of a very feeble minority would be enough,
because of this division, to reject a motion that a great majority had
really accepted. It is clear that such an institution would have the same
effect as one in which a relative plurality, more or less strong, was
required to adopt a proposition; but it would lead to this same end only
in an uncertain and bizarre manner. This combination is not, therefore,
226. See William Piker, The Justification of Bicameralism, 13 INTERN'L POL. SC. REV. 101
(1992). For a brief discussion of Riker's study, see also PiKER, supra note 13, at 112-13.
227. See discussion atsupra notes 48-50, 155-71 and accompanying text.
228. Levmore, Bicameralism, supra note 16, at 147-48.
229. In his extraordinarily laudatory eulogy of Franklin, Condorcet noted that "elle [la constitution
de Pennsylvanie] se distingue de la pluplart des autres par une 6galit6 plus grande, et de toutes, en ce
que le pouvoir ldgislatif y est confi6 A une seule chambre de repr6sentants." Condorcet, Skloge de M.
Franklin, 3 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 372, 401 (the Pennsylvania State constitution
"distinguished itself from most of the others by a greater equality, and above all, in that it confined the
legislative powers to a single chamber of representatives").
230. See Condorcet, Examen sur cette question: Est-il utile de diviser une assembled nationale en
plusieurs chambres? [Examination of the Question: Is It Useful to Divide a National Assembly Into
Multiple Chambers?], in 9 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET, supra note 1, at 333.
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the work of apolitical theory born in an enlightened age.231
This last remark provides a key to unraveling the Condorcet Irony.
Condorcet never abandoned the search for trth and reasoned outcomes.
Ultimately, he believed in the power of education and deliberation. Like the
civic republicans, he believed that participants could develop policies in the
"public interest" through democratic majority vote decision rules, as long as
the participants were sufficiently enlightened and deliberative. Although the
process might not identify the perfectly correct result, education and
deliberation provided the key to an increased probability of decisions for the
common good.
E. Condorcet's Potential Contribution to the Modern Discourse
Social choice and republicanism offer two very different conceptions of
democracy. One might be called a preference conception and the other an
epistemic conception.232 Oddly, Condorcet's major contribution to the
modem debate within the preference conception seems to be a pessimistic
one: no voting method works. Condorcet has a much more optimistic
contribution to make to the epistemic conception of democracy. Viewing
collective decision making in probabalistic terms should raise very different
questions about voters and voting mechanisms.
Condorcet's focus is the probability of truth in collective decision-making
results. He sought to increase the probability of true outcomes largely
through increasing the competence of individual participants and through
modest adjustments in vote tallying mechanisms. While civic republicans
seem to focus more on the process of deliberation than on finding truth, they
too believe in the possibility of "substantively correct outcomes. 233
Virtually since the beginning of time, philosophers have been attempting
to define truth.234 Any contribution to this grand philosophic debate is well
beyond the scope of this Article. 235 Nevertheless, a brief pause to consider
231. Condorcet, Constitutional Plan, supra note 172, at 156 (emphasis added).
232. I have borrowed these terms from David M. Estlund. See Estlund et al., supra note 119 (in
his contribution to article written with three other authors).
233. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying notes 66, 80.
234. Indeed, A.J. Ayer identified this as chief among philosophy's perennial problems. See A.J.
AYER, PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTR y 3 (1982) (identifying chief philosophic problem as
"the problem of objectivity, appearing ... sometimes as the issue between absolute and relativistic
theories of truth").
235. Moreover, such a contribution would be well beyond the competence of its author, who was
unable to answer a related question from her six-year old daughter. After her daughter made an
assertion, Mom challenged her, asking, "Is that really true?" The daughter responded, "Mommy,
what's truth?"
1998] 1023
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what Condorcet might have meant by truth seems appropriate at this point in
the discussion.
If Condorcet understood truth in collective decision making to mean that
there is one, and only one, objectively correct answer to any particular social
or political issue, his views would be very difficult to defend. To the
contrary, it appears that Condorcet, consciously or unconsiously, rejected an
absolute theory in favor of a relativistic theory of truth. Although Condorcet
lived before pragmatism was established as a philosophical school, he would
undoubtedly have accepted many of John Dewey's "pragmatist" or
"instrumentalist" views.236 Dewey took a process-oriented approach,
sometimes preferring to substitute the term "inquiry" for "truth. 237 He held
that "[m]eaning is conceived in terms of social procedure and social
consequences," and the "[r]ight or correct meaning is that which social
custom prescribes and sanctions." 38 In other words, truth is the relative
consensus or understanding arrived at through the intelligent inquiry of the
community. Dewey described the process:
The function of reflective thought is to transform a situation in
which there is experienced obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of
some sort, into a situation that is clear, coherent, settled,
harmonious....
... [S]uggestions arise of possible courses of action ... [leading]
to new observations and recollections and to a reconsideration of
observations already made in order to test the worth of the suggested
way out.... This continuous interaction of the facts disclosed by
observation and of the suggested proposals of solution and the
suggested methods of dealing with conditions goes on till some
236. The earliest versions of pragmatism apparently were developed by C.S. Pierce in 1878, and
later popularized by William James at the turn of the century. See JONES, supra note 212, at 34-35.
Dewey's particular version of pragmatism is often referred to as "instrumentalism." Id. at 35. A
comprehensive discussion of the different nuances of thought within the pragmatist movement are well
beyond the scope of this Article. In fact, William James himself began with the following observation
in one of his lectures on truth, "It is a very ticklish subject, sending subtle rootlets into all kinds of
crannies, and hard to treat in the sketchy way that alone befits a public lecture." William James,
Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, reprinted in PRAGMATISM IN FOCUS 99 (Doris Olin ed. 1992).
Similarly, this Article can provide only a sketch of the connection between Condorcet and John
Dewey's notions of"truth."
237. Although pragmatism was a very popular philosophical school, Dewey's process-oriented
approach to truth has also been the subject of much critical skepticism. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note
120, at 774-82.
238. John Dewey, The Problem of Truth, reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 213, at
17.
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suggested solution meets all the conditions of the case and does not
run counter to any discoverable feature of it.
239
Dewey acknowledged that there was no absolute, eternal truth. At the
same time, he believed that an intelligent, educated community could deal
with social and political problems and that "there are ... more and more
adequate instrumentalities for dealing with always changing and growing
human situations., 240 Although the community may not arrive at perfect
solutions through collective decision making, some solutions can be
identified as more reasonable or true than others.
Condorcet's probabalistic theory of elections and his search for true
outcomes closely resembles Dewey's process-oriented notions of truth. This
process incorporates three critical components: 1) quality of deliberation or
inputs of a well-educated community; 2) quantity of inputs; and 3) vote
mechanism. With respect to each of these components, he looked for
mechanisms that would ultimately improve the probability of a good result.
Condorcet's potential contributions to the modem discourse should be
considered in light of each of these components.
1. Quality of Inputs
There are two possibilities for improving the quality of inputs to a
collective choice mechanism: 1) improve the competence or ability of the
individual participants; and 2) improve the quality of the deliberative process
itself. Turning first to the issue of competence, Condorcet's probabilistic
view of voting clearly assumes a minimal level of voter competence.
Assuming that the average competence of group members is greater than
one-half, Condorcet argued that a decision by majority had a high probability
of being correct.241
From the epistemic or probabilistic view of collective decision making,
one should be more concerned about how well the voters understand the
issues on which they are voting than with whether or not the voting
mechanism precisely reflects individual preferences. In this context,
Condorcet's emphasis on universal, free, public education is quite
understandable. He argued that public instruction is an obligation owed by
society to all citizens.4 2
239. JONES, supra note 212, at 38-39 (emphasis omitted) (citing JOHN DEWEY, How WE THINK
100-07 (Heath 1933) (1910)).
240. JONES, supra note 212, at 41.
241. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 187.
1998] 1025
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a) Education as a Right
If the probability of more substantively correct or more reasonable
outcomes increases as the competence of participants rises, the most
important contribution Condorcet can make to the current dialogue is to
reinvigorate the discussion of education policy, not just in itself, but also in
connection to citizen participation in the social and political community.
Although many have contributed strong arguments in favor of recognizing a
right to education as implied under our present Constitution, the Supreme
Court has yet to recognize such a right. As a consequence, issues regarding
the funding and adequacy of public education are left to state legislatures and
state courts. Ultimately, education policy in the United States is determined
largely at the state level, leading to disparity in the quality of education from
one state to the next. Many state courts have found violations of state
constitutional rights to education in particular school districts within the state
and have ordered these school districts to conform their educational
programs or funding to meet constitutional requirements. The major obstacle
to correcting these problems has been the absence of effective enforcement
of these state court orders.243 Given that the states have not been very
effective in eliminating disparities in education quality and funding, and
given that the Supreme Court appears unlikely to recognize an implied right
to education in the foreseeable future, Congress should seriously consider a
federal constitutional amendment establishing such a right.
Moreover, even where disparities in public education are being addressed
by the states, the focus has been on providing a minimally adequate
elementary and secondary public education. This simply is not enough. As
costs of a college education escalate, those of modest means increasingly find
that continuation of their education is impossible. Condorcet's prodding
should cause more serious consideration of the possibility of providing free,
public college education.244
243. For a discussion ofmany of these state cases and the subsequent failures of enforcement, see,
for example, Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U.
CI. L. REv. 795 (1995).
244. This is not necessarily to suggest that free access to post-secondary education be available to
each and every citizen. One might, for example, limit such education to those who pass appropriate
qualifying exams. This is the model in most European countries, which provide different types of free,
publicly funded, higher education to students passing varying qualifying exams. See generally HIGHER
EDUCATION IN EUROPE (Claudius Gellert ed., 1993). This collection of essays includes discussion of
the higher educational system in several European countries. See, e.g., Id. at 59-60, 64.65
(qualifications for different types of publicly funded post-baccalaureate eduction in France); Id. at 168-
69 (publicly financed higher education based upon qualifying exams in Denmark); Id. at 207-08
(tuition-free higher education based upon qualifying exams in Austria).
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b) The Debate over School Vouchers
A combination of free-market principles and deep concern over the
quality of education and the safety of students in the public schools has led to
many proposals for school voucher or certificate programs.245 The modem
notion of vouchers dates back at least to the 1950s and often is attributed to
Milton Friedman.246Although there are many variations, "a typical system
generally includes a state certificate given to parents who then submit it to an
educational institution of their choice. The certificate or voucher is then
redeemed for cash payment."247 Some voucher programs are limited to poor
families and to participating schools,248 while others provide vouchers for all
students that can be applied to tuition at private schools of the parents'
choice. 249 Before simply accepting currently popular proposals such as
school voucher programs, one must understand that the issue is more than
simply freedom of choice. Freedom for parents to choose schools for their
children must be balanced with the need to develop proper curricula and
skills for participation in a democratic society. According to one educational
economist,
Education lies at the intersection of two sets of competing rights. The
first is the right of parents to choose the experiences, influences and
values to which they expose their children, the right to rear their
children in the manner that they see fit. The second is the right of a
245. Although there have been many proposals, few have been adopted. The first general publicly
funded school choice program was enacted by the Wisconsin legislature in 1989. See Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1995). The only other operating program
is the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program in Cleveland. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979
(West 1997).
246. Elchanan Cohn, Public and Private School Choices: Theoretical Considerations and
Empirical Evidence, in MARKET APPROACHES TO EDUCATION 3 (Elchanan Cohn ed., 1997).
247. Frank R. Kemerer et al., Vouchers and Private SchoolAutonomy, 21 J.L. & EDUC. 601, 602
(1992). A useful discussion of different approaches to vouchers appears in Henry M. Levin, The
Economics of Educational Choice, in MARKET APPROACHES TO EDUCATION, supra note 246, at 23,
31-35.
248. For example, the Milwaukee program, see supra note 245, is limited to students from
families whose incomes do not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty level. See WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.23(2)(a)l.
249. The use of public funds to support tuition costs for children attending private religious
schools raises serious constitutional issues. The Milwaukee program, see supra note 245, recently
survived establishment clause challenges under the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. See
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-376, 1998 WL 596682 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1998). On the other hand, the Cleveland program was declared unconstitutional, but continues
to operate pending appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-
982, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997). A discussion of the constitutionality of voucher
programs is beyond the scope of this Article. For a general discussion of these issues, see Frank P,
Kemerer, The Constitutionality of School Vouchers, 4 EDUC. L.Q. 646 (1995).
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democratic society to use the educational system as a means to
reproduce its most essential political, economic, and social institutions
through a common schooling experience.2
Moreover, concerns for equality suggest that careful analysis be
undertaken to consider how school vouchers are likely to be used and what
impact such use will have on the quality of education and distribution of
education resources. The American Federation of Teachers, for example,
fears that selective admissions standards will cause administrators of private
schools, rather than parents, to make most of the "choices" about which
school students will be permitted to attend. Moreover, many proposed
voucher programs would cover only a portion of private tuition costs, leaving
parents without a realistic opportunity to send their children to a private
school of their choice.252 If so, school voucher programs simply may be a tax
cut for those who already do, or otherwise would, send their children to
private schools. Under a school voucher program, children might well find
themselves further segregated along social class, race and religious lines.
Given the cost of private education, private schools generally tend not to be
particularly diverse either. School voucher programs may support some
families' decisions to send a child to private schools but are unlikely to make
high cost private education more widely available to those who otherwise
could not afford the high tuition. As a result, another important consideration
in assessing proposed school voucher programs is the extent to which they
may decrease diversity in the schools. 2
53
Another question is the extent to which school voucher programs will
affect the quality of education.25a Although Condorcet generally believed in
250. Levin, supra note 247, at 23,27-28.
251. According to one economist, "the 'coefficient of ignorance' appears to remain much larger
than the 'coefficient of knowledge."' Cohn, supra note 246, at 3, 17.
252. See American Federation of Teachers, Fact Sheet on Vouchers: Argument and Evidence, 19
AM. EDUCATOR 28 (1995).
253. At least one simulation model concludes that "[e]ven in the most favorable case, a systemic
choice system would not come close to equalizing educational opportunity across income groups."
Charles F. Manski, Educational Choice (Vouchers) and Social Mobility, in MARKET APPROACHES TO
EDUCATION, supra note 246, at 97, 124. Based on actual experience with choice programs in Britain,
France and The Netherlands, another researcher concludes that "[t]he European experience ...
suggests that the primary negative effect of school choice is its natural tendency to increase the
educational gap between the privileged and the underprivileged. With some exceptions, most studies
of the social effects of school choice within the public sector in the United States have reached the
same conclusion." John S. Ambler, Who Benefits from Educational Choice? Some Evidence from
Europe, in MARKET APPROACHES TO EDUCATION, supra note 246, at 353, 372.
254. One of the arguments for school voucher programs is that such programs will increase the
efficiency and quality of eduction. Studies regarding the effectiveness of public as opposed to private
education, including studies of private and public schools participating in the Milwaukee school choice
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free-market principles, one suspects that he would have weighed in heavily
against the type of school choice offered through voucher programs. Despite
his belief in free markets with respect to economic matters, Condorcet
undoubtedly would say that education is simply too fundamental to be left to
the marketplace. At the same time, Condorcet feared the totalitarianism he
had seen during the monarchical ancien regime.255 Thus, he advocated strict
limitations on public authority: "After having determined the object and the
extent of each subject of instruction, the public authority must make certain
that the choice of teachers, books, or methods is in accord with the reason of
enlightened men of the time, and leave all else to their influence., 256 He
envisioned the public using its collective intelligence to establish appropriate
public school curricula.
c) The Debate over Curricula
Given the period in which he was writing, Condorcet focused primarily
on making public education universally available without regard to gender or
wealth. The primacy of this goal left him without the luxury of considering
many details about proper public school curricula. Now that education is
more broadly available without regard to gender, and arguably at least,
without regard to wealth, Condorcet's vision might be extended by looking
to Dewey's insights about education. In that regard, he would recommend
that there be more systematic thought about the reasons for low competence
of voters. When the probability of truth of the voter's opinion falls below
program, have reached conflicting results. For a discussion of some of these conflicting results, see, for
example, Andrew S. Latham, School Vouchers: Much Debate, Little Research, EDUC. LEADERSHIP 82,
Oct. 1998, at 82, 85 ("Two separate teams of researchers have examined the results of the [Milwaukee]
program, with widely differing conclusions about its impact on student adchievement."). See also, e.g.,
Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 113 Q.J. ECON. 553 (1998).
255. One biographer observed that "although invoking independence of education, Condorcet did
not think that the state should abstain from supplying the bases of scholastic organization. Education
left to itself, he states, would become a prerogative of the wealthier part of the population, would
spread unevenly through the nation, and would turn into a privilege of the most affluent areas." Rente
Waldinger, Condorcet: The Problematic Nature of Progress, in CONDORCET STUDIES, supra note 89,
at 117,135.
256. Condorcet, Instruction, supra note 187, at 131. Condorcet's concerns here reflect an age-old
tension. A recent article with a more modem discussion of this tension closes with a statement that
resonates in Condorcet's times and our own: "Public education is an ideological enigma. Schools are
asked simultaneously to respect and nurture both the communal and individual aspects of the human
spirit.... The school system.., epitomizes the tension between the focus of liberal political theory
on individual autonomy and the community's need to sustain and perpetuate itself." Stanley Ingber,
Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall ofOrthodoxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987
ILL. L. REv. 15, 94-95; see also supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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one-half, Condorcet suggested that only voter prejudice can explain this
result.257 Prejudice often begins very early in life and results from lack of
exposure to, and understanding of, others from different backgrounds.
Curricular programs designed to expose young children to many different
types of people and cultures should be encouraged.
If collective decision making is to involve a community of participants
whose suggestions or preferences can be transformed through dialogue and
deliberation, then our educational system must foster a sympathetic
understanding and respect for diverse cultures. This observation caused at
least one commentator to comment critically that "[w]ithin the
multiculturalism of today, many want not to assimilate but to isolate in terms
of their heritage and customs., 258 The insights of Dewey's pragmatism, she
continued, call for a different approach. "The uniqueness of diverse cultures,
as representative of the individual perspective, must be maintained not
through separation from, but through a dynamic interplay with, the common
perspective, bringing about a resultant enrichment of each. For this to occur,
however, students from diverse cultures cannot sit in different classrooms
.... ,259 While many schools and school systems theoretically support the
concept of diversity in the classroom, the reality is that neighborhoods
continue to be naturally segregated, resulting in schools that are also
segregated. For Condorcet, one suspects that multicultural education would
not consist of merely "exposure" and "openness" to different cultures and
values devoid of any judgments. In a provacative book, Professor Allan
Bloom more recently challenged the new culture of openness or "live and let
live" that he sees as the basic tenet of modem educational programs: "It is
open to all kinds of men, all kinds of life-styles, all ideologies. There is no
enemy other than the man who is not open to everything., 260 Bloom argues
that some values are more important than others, and that moral education
should be included in the curriculum. He asks, "when there are no shared
goals or vision of the public good, is the social contract any longer
possible?"261 If every approach is entitled to equal respect, moral education
becomes virtually impossible.262
In part, Bloom charges John Dewey with responsibility for this movement
257. See Estlund et al, supra note 119, at 1323 (remarks of Jeremy Waldron).
258. Sandra Rosenthal, Democracy and Education: A Deweyan Approach, 43 EDUC. THEORY
377,387 (1993).
259. Id.
260. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 27 (1987).
261. Id.
262. For further discussion of the role of moral education, see infra notes 270-72 and
accompanying text.
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to opennesss. He asserts:
Liberalism without natural rights, the kind that we knew from John
Stuart Mill and John Dewey, taught us that the only danger
confronting us is being closed to the emergent, the new,
manifestations of progress. No attention had to be paid to the
fundamental principles or the moral virtues that inclined men to live
according to them.263
This critique of Dewey seems overstated. In any event, even if Dewey's
vision is focused entirely on developing the characteristic of openness,
Condorcet would likely part company with Dewey at this point. Although he
advocated strict limits on public authority in order to avoid the teaching of
dogmatic truths, Condorcet surely did not accept the "live and let live"
attituc of openness described by Bloom. Ethics was an important part of
Condorcet's proposed instructional program, as long as the teaching of ethics
was strictly independent of religious opinions.26 Condorcet surely did pay
attention to fundamental principles and moral virtues. For Condorcet, there
were certain fixed natural rights, which could be taught. He argued that
"[t]ruth and justice are the same in all countries for all men."265 Perhaps the
best evidence for this last point is Condorcet's passionate objection to
slavery, long before opposition to slavery became more common.266
Dewey's insights applied to the Condorcet/civic republican vision also
provide support for a much more hands-on, experiential education designed267
to develop inquisitiveness and creative intelligence. The goal of such an
education should be "development of the ability both to create and to respond
constructively to the creation of novel perspectives, as well as to incorporate
the perspective of the other-not as something totally alien, but as something
sympathetically understood-is at once growth of community and growth of
self.268 One modem response of some school programs to deteriorating
student test scores has been to avoid decisions about which values and skills
to teach and to a return to the "empty vessel" view of education in which the
primary function of education is to transmit information, rather than to foster
263. BLOOM, supra note 260, at 29; see also Schapiro, supra note 87, at 202 ("He [Condorcet]
proposed to substitute moral and civic for religious instruction, a policy later followed by the Third
French Republic.").
264. See Condorcet, Instruction, supra note 187, at 127.
265. Condorcet, Essay on the Constitution and Functions of the Provincial Assemblies (1788),
translated in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 84, 86.
266. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., John A. Saltmarsh, John Dewey and the Future of Cooperative Education, 28 J.
COOp. EDUC. 6 (1992).
268. Rosenthal, supra note 258, at 384.
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interpersonal communication and creative problem solving skills.269 Surely,
some basic, shared knowledge is essential if one is to participate in the
modem discourse. An education that over-emphasizes facts, however, is not
likely to create citizens capable of engaging in deliberative dialogue.
d) The Role ofMoral Education
A final concern represented in the modem discourse is the extent to which
moral education should be incorporated into the curriculum and defining the
scope and content of such education. In a provocative article, Professor
Miriam Galston challenged liberals with a civic republican belief in the
importance of deliberative dialogue for their assumption that citizens are
naturally capable of deliberation or motivated or predisposed to engage in a
deliberative dialogue that considers the needs of the entire community.270 She
argues that the ability to reason thoughtfully as well as the motivation or
willingness to engage in deliberative dialogue requires certain moral
foundations.27' Many have resisted including moral education in the schools
for fear that such education would be overly coercive or totalitarian or
otherwise lead to an overly homogeneous community. We tend to think of
moral education as a religious or family matter. Professor Galston argues that
moral education is necessary if the vision of deliberative democracy is to
succeed and she urges liberals to consider these issues more systematically.
To be sure, proper precautions must be designed to minimize the risk of such
coerciveness or totalitariansim. 72 Condorcet may contribute to the modem
discourse by providing further support for Professor Galston's argument that
moral education is a prerequisite to developing the necessary skills and
motivation to engage in truly deliberative dialogue.
e) Access to Information
In addition to improving the competence of individual participants, an
increased quality of inputs requires improvements in the deliberative process
269. Perhaps the best exemplar of this movement is a best selling book including a list of 5000
essential names, phrases, dates and concepts that every literate American should know. See E.D.
HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW 152-215 (1988)
(including such things as: "Aladdin's lamp," "an apple a day keeps the doctor away" and "teeny-
bopper").
270. See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the
Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994). For a civic republican
definition of deliberation, see supra note 182.
271. Seeid.at368.
272. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
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itself. However generally competent the participants may be, they cannot
fully participate without adequate information. All participants should have
equal access and exposure to information necessary to making an informed
choice. To be sure that such information is provided, it will be important to
reassess the methods and procedures through which information is
distributed. As we rely more on computers and the Intemet, we must
understand that many in our society do not have access to computers. We
should consider the extent to which the government has a responsibility to
provide that access.273
2. Quantity of Input
Condorcet's work also may have something to offer in determining the
appropriate size of decision-making bodies. This issue is directly connected
to the competence levels of voters. In Condorcet's view, the probability of
reaching a correct result increases as the size of the group increases, as long
as the probable truth of each voter's vote is greater than one-half. Under this
analysis, a small group of highly competent voters may reach a better result
than a large group of less enlightened voters. For example, a small group of
legislative representatives may be better informed than the general voting
public about complex policy issues under consideration. As such, perhaps
such complex policy decisions should be left to the legislature rather than the
general voting public through public referenda.
Another interesting observation about effective size of the decision-
making body relates to the extent to which some members of the group defer
to others. If voters do not exercise their own individual judgments, but
instead defer to other voters, Condorcet suggests that this deference
decreases the effective size of the group, thus decreasing the probability of a
correct decision.274 This way of thinking should cause more systematic
thought about deference in group decision making. The phenomenon surely
appears within juries, but also within legislatures when legislators vote in
blocks or follow the party line. This analysis again may bring something to
bear on school curricular choices. School curricula emphasizing student self-
esteem and assertiveness may be useful in developing adults more likely to
be confident about their judgments and less likely to defer to others.
273. This would not necessarily require a computer in every home at government expense. It
might be sufficient, for example, to ensure that community public libraries offer adequate access to the
Interet.
274. See Estlund et al., supra note 119, at 1320-22 (remarks of David Estlund).
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3. The Vote Mechanism
In cases involving merely an inauthentic result, Condorcet found a
solution generally accepted as correct in the academic world. Procedures
should be developed for application of the Condorcet winner rule in real
world decision making. Thus, even when simple majority vote provides a
definitive answer, it should also be clear that the winner beat all others in all
possible two-way comparisons.z75 This approach would require reform of
procedures for selecting candidates in multicandidate primaries and elections.
It might also suggest reform in instructions to juries as they consider complex
cases with more than two possible outcomes.
With respect to the inconsistent results case, Condorcet conceded that no
voting mechanism could completely avoid or eliminate the vote cycling
problem. On the other hand, he believed that some methods had a higher
probability of reaching correct outcomes than others. Specifically he
proposed to put all choices to pairwise votes and to eliminate the pairwise
comparisons receiving the lowest pluralities until a clear decision was
reached.276 Many have been critical of this approach, some suggesting that
the method suggested by de Borda, Condorcet's colleague at the Academie
Frangaise, is better.277 That debate is beyond the scope of this Article and is
rightly left to those more sophisticated in mathematics. For the moment, the
point is that some responses to the vote cycle problem are better than others.
The alternatives should be carefully considered and possible reforms to
simple majority voting procedures in complex cases should be debated.
On a more detailed level, Condorcet raised additional reforms worth
thinking about today. For example, he suggested problems with "incomplete"
votes in which some voters abstain on some issues. On this point, he
observes, "Any election method in which the votes given are incomplete will
produce results which contradict the will which the majority would have had
if complete votes had been collected., 278 As a result, he suggests that each
voter should express his complete will, even if the voter is indifferent.
Condorcet thus additionally suggests that procedures regarding the treatment
of abstentions in group decision making should be carefully developed.
Condorcet's thinking and writing regarding group decision making is so
extensive and thorough that one is bound to uncover additional ideas through
an exploration of his life's work.
275. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 163.
278. Condorcet, On Elections, supra note 164, at 237.
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VI. CONCLUSION
One of the difficulties in understanding Condorcet's theory of elections is
reconciling two very different strands of his argument. As a believer in the
infinite perfectibility of man and in the possibility of truth, Condorcet saw
most collective decisions, other than the most obviously personal, as
judgment aggregations, for which he sought the greatest probability of
reaching a correct or true decision. At the same time, the examples in his
1785 Essay reveal his interest in the techniques of aggregating individual
preferences-preference aggregation. 279 Black concluded that Condorcet was
forced to abandon the search for truth and probabilities. Black noted, "The
course which [Condorcet] takes at this point [in response to the inauthentic
results case] leads him out of the difficulty-and out of the calculus of
probabilities."2 0 In the end, Black asserted that the Condorcet winner
solution to the inauthentic results difficulty is based on straightforward
reasoning (simple raisonnement) rather than strict probability theory. Again,
in the context of the inconsistent results case, Black notes that probability
theory fails to provide an answer and "again Condorcet falls back on
'straightforward reasoning.' 28' If Black is correct that Condorcet abandoned
an epistemic conception of group decision making based upon probability
theory in favor of a preference conception of vote aggregation mechanisms,
perhaps it is appropriate to think of Condorcet as the father of social choice
theory.28
2
Based on the larger view of Condorcet's lifetime work, however, Black
appears to be wrong.28 3 Although Condorcet had to address the practical
issues of preference aggregation, to the end, he remained focused on the
more fundamental issues of perfecting the social arts-arriving at reasoned
solutions to collective issues for the community. The contrast between
Condorcet's deliberative, republican vision and Arrow's economic vision is
quite remarkable. In his Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow
279. Describing these two aspects, H.P Young observed, "Condorcet's initial objective was to
design a method for estimating the 'true' ranking of the candidates. But he also recognized that the
problem is often one of determining which single candidate is most likely to be best." Young, supra
note 119, at 1237.
280. See BLACK, supra note 31, at 70.
281. Id. at 172.
282. "Stripped of its probabilistic formulations, [Condorcet's] analysis can be far more readily
understood as a logic of preferential choice.' BAKER, supra note 32, at 383-84.
283. Keith Baker, history professor at the University of Chicago, also challenges Black's
conclusion, responding that "Condorcet's probabilistic formulations were fundamental to his
conception of decision-making as the collective search for truth; they were essential to the problem of
consent as he came to define it in the Essal." Id. at 384.
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assumes "that individual values are taken as data and are not capable of being
altered by the nature of the decision process itself.' 284 Arrow concludes, "If
individual values can themselves be affected by the method of social choice,
it becomes much more difficult to learn what is meant by one method's being
preferable to another."285 Condorcet would probably have responded that the
method of social choice should affect (and improve) individual values. At the
same time, he would probably have conceded that this recognition makes
assessment of vote aggregating mechanisms more difficult. Condorcet
probably would have urged taking up the challenge and rejecting a view of
political decision making as simple preference aggregation. He probably
would have agreed that a pure preference aggregation model is appropriate as
applied to purely personal decisions, such as the proper topping for pizza. On
the other hand, the quote with which this Article begins suggests that
Condorcet would demand much more of the judgment aggregation involved
in most juridical and political decisions: a high probability of correct or just
results.
Strikingly, Condorcet did not let his own discovery of the voting paradox
in 1785 get in the way of his later advocacy of democratic decision-making
principles with the greatest probability of true results. Even in his early 1785
Essay, Condorcet concluded that "the form of the assemblies which decide
men's lot is much less important for their happiness than the enlightenment
of those who sit in these assemblies; and the progress of reason will
contribute more to the happiness of peoples than the form of political
constitutions. 286 Were he alive today, Condorcet would probably respond to
the current social choice theory focus on mechanism by suggesting that social
choice theorists are barking up the wrong tree. The solution Condorcet offers
to his voting paradox is not to obsess about it, but to move on. People may
not all agree on which methods offer the highest probability of substantively
correct outcomes. Nevertheless, a probabalistic approach will cause those
people to think very differently about solutions to the collective choice
problem.
Surely, the work of social choice theorists should not be abandoned or
ignored. For example, Condorcet surely would applaud the work of those
seeking an equitable way to improve processes that increase structure-
induced equilibrium. Although it is important to think carefully about
alternative procedures for aggregating votes, Condorcet would prefer greater
emphasis on reforms to increase the knowledge of participants to the political
284. ARROW, supra note 6, at 7.
285. Id. at 8.
286. Condorcet, Essay, supra note 21, at 57.
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debate and, thereby, improve the quality of deliberation. The result would be
an increased probability of a reasoned outcome and a better chance of
achieving the most important goal for all juridical and political decisions:
justice.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/3
